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“I always turn to the sports page first. The sports page records people’s accomplishments; the 
front page nothing but man’s failure.”1 
Chief Justice Earl Warren 
 
 We live in the age of globalization. We also live in an era where disputes spill over 
borders and boundaries. As more and more of these transnational disputes arise, we have seen a 
profusion of international tribunals opening their doors to meet demand. Unfortunately, even the 
most celebrated of these tribunals are, at best, works in progress.  
According to its critics, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) and its sister court for Rwanda (“ICTR”) have squandered billions of dollars, failed to 
advance human rights, and ignored the wishes of victims the courts claim to represent.2 The 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has been harshly criticized for its inability to stop the 
genocide in Bosnia3 and its powerlessness in the face of US non-compliance in Nicaragua v. 
U.S.4 In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Iran denied ICJ jurisdiction, 
refused to appear, and ignored the court’s order to release American hostages.5 Detractors have 
charged that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) only exacerbated the conflict in Uganda 
by issuing warrants against top rebel leaders.6 And these are just a few examples of frustrated 
attempts at international dispute resolution.  
                                                 
1 See Matthew J. Mitten, Symposium: Sports Law as a Reflection of Society, Law, and Value, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 
999, 999 (1997) (citing Alec Lewis, THE QUOTABLE QUOTATIONS BOOK 262 (Simon & Schuster 1980)).  
2 See Helena Cobbin, Think Again: International Courts, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 1, 2006, at 22.  
3 See Geoffrey S. DeWeese, The Failure of the International Court of Justice to Effectively Enforce The Genocide 
Convention, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 625, 628 (1998).  
4 See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337 (2004).  
5 See, e.g., Janis, The Role of the International Court in the Hostage Crisis, 13 CONN. L. REV. 263 (1981).  
6 Cobbin, supra note 2.  
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 However, there is at least one international court that rises above the frustrations that 
plague its more heralded brethren. This ascendant tribunal is the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(“CAS”). Its creators dreamed that CAS would become the “supreme court of world sport,” and 
it has largely fulfilled this vision.7 Today, CAS boasts a roster of 250 specialized sports 
arbitrators from around the world.8 The court has permanent offices in Switzerland, the United 
States, and Australia.9 CAS has jurisdiction over some of the world’s most powerful sports 
bodies; it is the court of final appeals for Olympic-related matters, arbitrates disputes for the 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”),10 and even has settled a contract 
dispute for the National Basketball Association (“NBA”).11 In a time of increasingly global 
complexity, CAS represents one of the world’s more successful attempts at bringing order to 
transnational issues.  
 Cynics may scoff at the remarkable success of CAS. Naysayers would focus on the fact 
that CAS speaks on medals and games, rather than atrocities or territorial annexations. But sport 
should be taken seriously, as it can inspire deep passion in people around the world. In 1969, a 
controversial World Cup qualifying match sparked a full-blown war between El Salvador and 
Honduras, a conflict known to history as the “Soccer War.”12 In 1985, there was a “soccer riot” 
                                                 
7 Ian Blackshaw, Sport’s court getting right results, GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 2004, at 31 (“[CAS] was the 
brainchild of the then International Olympic Committee (IOC) president Juan Antonio Samaranch, who envisioned 
the CAS as a supreme court for world sport.”). 
8 See Lily Henning, Judging the Games: For banned athletes, their last shot at Olympic Glory lies with a small 
panel of arbitrators, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 1. 
9 See Richard H. McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The Ad Hoc Division at the Olympic 
Games, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 515, 520 (2001).  
10 In its governing statutes, FIFA has officially recognized CAS “to resolve disputes between FIFA, Members, 
Confederations, Leagues, clubs, Players, Officials and licensed match agents and players’ agents.” VIII FIFA STAT. 
Art. 59, Para. 1 (2005).  
11 Jerry C. Harris, Comment, The Iakovos Tsakilidis Dispute Between the Phoenix Suns and Greek AEK Before the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 531, 531 (2001).  
12 See Ronald J. Glossup, CONFRONTING WAR: AN EXAMINATION OF HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING PROBLEM 103  
(McFarland 2001) (“In 1969 a three-game series to determine who would represent Central America in the World 
Cup soccer championship touched off a short “Soccer War” between El Salvador and Honduras.”). 
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in Belgium when British fans attacked Italian supporters.13 When U.S. speed skater Apollo 
Anton Ohno entangled himself with a South Korean skater during a race at the 2002 Salt Lake 
City Olympics, it inspired such outrage in South Korea that the incident is widely seen as a 
turning point in U.S.-Korea relations.14 In short, cynics are simply mistaken when they denigrate 
the importance of sports. Sport inspires our passions, captures our hopes, and gives us reason to 
dream.   
 This article asks why CAS succeeds while so many international tribunals have failed. 
Part I gives basic background information on CAS, describing its history, jurisdiction, and 
procedures. Part II critically evaluates the success of CAS along two specific dimensions: party 
preference and speech act theory. Ultimately, it will become apparent that despite looming 
threats, CAS remains a hopeful and valuable example of how an international tribunal can 
succeed. Through creativity and cooperation, sports officials have created a working, functioning 
international tribunal that can serve as an example for future efforts at transnational dispute 
resolution. 
Perhaps Earl Warren was right when he said that the sports pages record the triumphs of 
humanity, while the front pages chronicle its failures. Most international tribunals tend to inhabit 
Warren’s front pages - only CAS can be found in the sports section. 
 
Part I: Background on the CAS 
 The concept for an international Court of Arbitration for Sport is widely credited to 
former International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) President Juan Antonio Samaranch. In 1981 
Samaranch noted that the Olympic Movement was sinking in a morass of legal disputes around 
                                                 
13 See id.  
14 See Korean View of the US: From Admiration to Antipathy, KOREA TIMES, May 10, 2003 (the Apollo Anton Ohno 
incident is described as a moment that marked a rise in antipathy towards the U.S.). 
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the globe.15 Consequently, Samaranch approached IOC member Keba Mbaye, who also 
happened to be a judge at the ICJ. Samaranch asked Mbaye to create an IOC-sponsored 
international tribunal, one built for the express purpose of quickly and efficiently handling 
Olympic sports disputes.16 
 Over the next few years, Judge Mbaye built the foundation for the CAS. The full IOC 
voted to create the CAS in 1983. On June 30, 1984, the IOC approved the statutes and 
regulations to govern the CAS, thereby formally “creating” the CAS.17 Finally, the CAS opened 
its doors and heard its first case in 1986.18 
 Samaranch’s original vision was to create a true “supreme court for world sport.”19 
Today, his dream has burgeoned into a vibrant, growing court.20 
 
Where is the CAS Located?  
In order to facilitate its role as a global arbitral body, the CAS currently operates three 
offices around the world. The CAS was originally founded in Lausanne, Switzerland. It is here 
that the General Secretary of the CAS still sits, and where most CAS arbitrations continue to take 
place. In 1996, the CAS expanded by opening decentralized offices in the United States and 
                                                 
15 In just the United States alone, Olympic institutions found themselves embroiled in a number of legal disputes. 
See U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Int’l Fed’n of Bodybuilders, No. 81-0969, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10278 (D.D.C. Dec. 
1, 1982), reprinted in 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353 (D.D.C.) (a trademark infringement action); Int’l Olympic Comm. v. 
S.F. Arts & Athletics, No. C-82-4183, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17586 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1982) (trademark 
infringement action); DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980) (athletes challenge the 
USOC’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games).  
16 See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1208 (2005). 
17 A. & B. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (May 27, 2003), reprinted in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS III 2000-2003 674, 680 
(Matthieu Reeb ed. Kluwer 2004). 
18 See Straubel, supra note 16, at 1260.  
19 See Blackshaw, supra note 7.  
20 See Henning, supra note 8, at 1. 
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Sydney, Australia.21 These decentralized offices were vested with all the authority of the 
Lausanne office, and were primarily intended to make the CAS more convenient to potential 
parties.  
In addition to its three permanent courts, the CAS also operates an ad hoc tribunal at 
major sports events like the Olympic Games.22 This ad hoc tribunal is composed of twelve CAS 
arbitrators who are on site and on call to hear cases twenty-four hours a day.23 If a case should 
arise during the Games, a panel of three arbitrators will convene and issue a ruling within 
twenty-four hours.24 The CAS uses these ad-hoc panels because of the time-sensitive nature of 
the Games. For example, suppose an athlete competing in the 100 meter sprint is appeals her 
disqualification during the preliminary round. The next round of the sprint may be the very next 
day. Without the CAS’ ad-hoc tribunal, either 1) organizers will have to postpone the entire 
event until the matter is resolved, 2) the athlete may lose her chance to compete, even though her 
claims may have merit, or 3) the athlete will be allowed to compete, even though she may have 
been properly disqualified. The ad-hoc panel eliminates the need to make such an unappealing 




                                                 
21 CAS originally located the American office in Denver, Colorado, a mecca for North American Olympic athletes. 
Later, this office was moved to New York, its current location.  
22 See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, art. S6(8) (2004), available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/pdy/CodeEngnov2004.pdf (last visited May 6, 2006). CAS operates an ad hoc division at the Olympic 
Games, Commonwealth Games, and European Football Championship. A. & B. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 
17, at 3.3.1. CAS first created the ad-hoc panel for the 1996 Atlanta Games. Since then, the ad-hoc panel has been 
on-site at every subsequent Olympic Games. See Symposium, Regulations Governing Drugs and Performance 
Enhancers in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 389 (2002). 
23 See Henning, supra note 8, at 1.  
24 See Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute Resolution at Games Time, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 489, 495 (2002).  
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What is the CAS’ Jurisdiction?  
 The CAS’ jurisdiction is limited to cases that meet two basic conditions. First, the parties 
must agree, in writing, to let the CAS arbitrate their dispute. Parties can do this in advance, by 
putting a provision in a contract, or by writing the requirement into the statutes or regulations of 
a sports organization.25 For example, at the 2004 Athens Games, the IOC required all 11,000 
athletes to sign the following clause, whereby signees essentially waive their right to sue in civil 
courts: 
 
I agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, in 
connection with, or on the occasion of, the Olympic Games, not 
resolved after exhaustion of the legal remedies established by . . . the 
International Federation governing my sport . . . and the IOC, shall be 
submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) for 
final and binding arbitration…. The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction 
and has the exclusive power to order provisional and conservatory 
measures. The decisions of the CAS shall be final and binding. I shall 
not institute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or seek any form of 
relief, in any other court or tribunal.26  
 
In addition, parties can also consent to CAS jurisdiction after a dispute arises, if they draft a 
written agreement to that effect.27 
Second, according to the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, the court is only 
empowered to hear disputes that relate to sports in some way.28 In practice, this has not been a 
                                                 
25 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. R27.  
26 See Kristin L. Savarese, Note, Judging the Judges: Dispute Resolution at the Olympic Games, 30 BROOKLYN J. 
INT’L L. 1107, 1111 (2005) (quoting Eligibility Entry Form of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, SPORTS ENTRIES 
AND QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEMS 8, at http://www.athens2004.com/Files/files/Pdf-Sports/SEQMASTER1EN.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2005)). In addition to the entry form, the CAS' jurisdiction is asserted in Rule 74 of the Olympic 
Charter; furthermore, many sports bodies have written CAS jurisdiction into their by-laws. GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-
KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 16, 24-
25 (Springer 2001). 
27 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. R27.  
28 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. R27 (“Such disputes may involve matters of principle 
relating to sport or matters of pecuniary or other interests brought into play in the practice or the development of 
sport and, generally speaking, any activity related or connected to sport”). 
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particularly high hurdle to meet; since it was created in 1994, the CAS has never actually 
dismissed a case because the dispute was insufficiently related to sports.29  
 
What Kinds of Cases Does CAS Hear?  
Given the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, parties bring three kinds of cases to the CAS: 
commercial disputes, disciplinary matters, and disputes over the results of a competition. 
Commercial disputes usually arise when there is a problem in executing a contract. To 
this extent, the CAS has heard disputes relating to corporate sponsorship of athletic events, the 
sale of television rights, the staging of sports events, player transfers, relations between players 
and teams, and relations between players and their agents. The CAS has also heard cases 
concerning tort liability, such as when an athlete is injured during a sports event.   
 The CAS also serves as the court of highest appeal for Olympic athletes when they are 
subject to disciplinary actions. These disciplinary cases are roughly analogous to criminal 
matters in the U.S. court system. Instead of crimes punishable by jail time, however, the CAS 
considers acts that can be punished with suspension from competition. The disciplinary actions 
that the CAS considers most often come from athletes accused of doping. Under current rules, an 
Olympic athlete who tests positive for a banned substance faces a two-year ban (on her first 
offense), or a lifetime ban (on her second offense) from competition. Accused athletes can, 
however, appeal a suspension to the CAS and hope that the court overturns their “conviction.” 
The CAS also hears many other kinds of disciplinary matters. For example, a player may be 
suspended for committing a violent act on the field of play, or for abusing a referee.30  
                                                 
29 See Matthieu Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS III 2001-2003 xxxiii 
(Matthieu Reeb ed. Kluwer 2004).  
30 Id. at xxxiii.   
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The CAS is most in the public eye, however, when athletes challenge the results of a 
competition, and claim that they were unjustly cheated from a medal or prize. For example, the 
CAS had the final word when Korean gymnast Yang Tae Young claimed he, not Paul Hamm, 
was the rightful winner of the men’s all-around title in the 2004 Athens Games.31 The CAS also 
was the final stop for Vanderlei Cordeiro de Lima, the Brazilian marathoner who claimed he 
would have won a gold medal in Athens, were he not tackled by a crazed spectator.32 In this class 
of cases, athletes argue that they were robbed of some competitive outcome that should, by right, 
be theirs.33 
 
How Does CAS Work?  
Unlike American courts, the CAS has relatively simple procedures before the hearing.  In 
order to submit a dispute to the CAS, claimants must first file a request with the court, along with 
a brief document that describes the dispute.34 At this point, the respondent is expected to file an 
answer.35 At this point, the CAS forms a one or three arbitrator “Panel” to hear the case.36 Unless 
the arbitration agreement calls for a one or three person Panel, the President of the CAS Division 
will determine the number.37 If the parties use a three-person Panel, each party picks one of the 
                                                 
31 See McLaren, supra note 9, at 199.  
32 See id. at 203-04.  
33 Another famous medal dispute arose at the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, when Canadian ice dancers Jamie Sale 
and David Pelletier were the victims of a judging conspiracy. Sale and Pelletier filed a formal application with CAS, 
asking the court to award them a gold medal “on the merits of the case.” Before the CAS could rule on the matter, 
however, the IOC awarded double-gold medals to both the Canadian and Russian ice dancing teams. See Richard 
Lacayo, A Sport on Thin Ice: A Bad Call – and Quick Recall – Expose a Darker Side of Olympic Skating, TIME, Feb. 
25, 2002, at 24. 
34 The complaint is suppose to contain: 1) a brief statement of the facts and legal argument, 2) a specific request for 
relief, and 3) documents that demonstrate that the CAS has jurisdiction over the dispute. Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration, supra note 22, at art. R38.  
35 This answer can be 1) a brief statement of defense, 2) a challenge to the CAS’ jurisdiction, and/or 3) a 
counterclaim. Id., at art. R39.  
36 Id. at art. R40.1.  
37 Id.  
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arbitrators; the two selected arbitrators then agree on the identity of the third.38 If parties use a 
one-arbitrator Panel, they are expected to mutually agree on that arbitrator.39 
 At this point, the President of the Panel reviews the file, and calls on the claimant to 
submit a full statement of the claim, and on the respondent to submit a response.40 In some 
circumstances, the Panel may allow each party to file a subsequent rebuttal.41 However, this is 
usually the extent of the pre-hearing practice, and the Panel sets a hearing date.42  
 At the hearing, the Panel hears sworn testimony from witnesses and experts that the 
parties have specified in their written submissions.43 After all testimony, parties are given the 
opportunity for a final argument, where the respondent has the final word.44 
 With this, the Panel issues its final judgment. This decision is made by majority vote 
among the Panelists, and if no majority can be reached, the President of the Panel has the 
authority to direct judgment.45 As a general matter, this judgment is final and binding on all 
parties.46 
 
How Does CAS Select Its Arbitrators? 
At its inception in 1984, the CAS was composed of a maximum of sixty arbitrators, 
selected for a renewable four-year period.47 Fifteen of these arbitrators were appointed by the 
IOC, fifteen by the International Federations for Olympic sports, fifteen by National Olympic 
                                                 
38 If the two appointed arbitrators cannot agree on a third arbitrator, she will be appointed by the President of the 
Division. Id. at art. R40.2. 
39 If the two parties cannot agree on a sole arbitrator, then she will be appointed by the President of the Division. Id. 
40 Id. at art. R44.1.  
41 See id.  
42 In some cases, the Panel may hold an evidentiary hearing, where discovery issues will be settled. Id. at art. R44.3. 
The President of the Panel sets this hearing date. Id. at art. R44.2.  
43 Id. at art. R44.2.  
44 See id.  
45 See id. at art. R46.  
46 Id.  
47 See Gundel v. Fed. Equestre Int’l, reprinted in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS I 1986-1998 567 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 
Kluwer 1998). 
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Committees, and the final fifteen were appointed by the IOC President.48 In essence, all sixty 
arbitrators were in some way selected by an Olympic institution; athletes had no direct input in 
this process.  
In these early years, CAS hearings were particularly affordable, as the IOC covered all of 
the CAS’ operating expenses.49 If the CAS heard a pecuniary dispute, parties were expected to 
contribute some percentage of the award to the CAS, in a proportion the parties would negotiate 
with the President of the Panel.50 However, non-pecuniary disputes were handled at no cost to 
the parties. No doubt, this made the CAS an enticing proposition for potential litigants.  
  
The First Challenge to the CAS as a Fair and Impartial Arbitral Body 
 In 1993, the CAS faced the first serious challenge to its legitimacy when the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal (essentially the Swiss Supreme Court) openly questioned whether the CAS was 
capable of impartially arbitrating disputes that involved the IOC. The International Equestrian 
Federation (“FEI”) had accused Elmer Gundel - a German equestrian rider - of illegally doping 
his horse at a major international competition. As a result, FEI stripped Gundel of all his prize 
money from that competition, and also suspended him for three months.51 After going through an 
internal hearing with FEI, Gundel appealed his suspension to CAS. CAS reduced Gundel’s 
suspension from three months to one, but Gundel remained unsatisfied and challenged the 
judgment, as a matter of public law, to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.52  
                                                 
48 These final fifteen members appointed by the IOC President were the only members that could not also be a 
member of an International Federation, NOC, or IOC. See id. at 567.  
49 See Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 
106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 541 (2002).  
50 See Gundel, supra note 47, at 567.  
51 Id. at 563.  
52 See Matthieu Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxv (Matthieu 
Reeb ed., Kluwer 2002). 
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Among his many claims, Gundel claimed that the CAS was not a truly independent 
arbitral body; in Gundel’s view, the CAS was essentially controlled by Olympic institutions like 
the FEI and the IOC.53 Though the Swiss court ultimately upheld the suspension, it expressed 
great concern over “the organic and economic ties existing between the CAS and the IOC.”54 In 
particular, the Swiss Federal Tribunal was disturbed that 1) the CAS was funded almost entirely 
by the IOC; 2) the IOC appointed half of all CAS arbitrators; and 3) only the IOC had the power 
to amend the statutes of the CAS.55 The Swiss Federal Tribunal concluded by noting that “it 
would desirable for greater independence of the CAS from the IOC.”56 Had the IOC been a 
direct party in the action against Gundel, the Swiss court may very well have thrown out the 
CAS judgment.57 
 While the Gundel court did not throw out the CAS award, the Swiss court’s dicta sent 
shockwaves through the CAS. “[The Swiss court’s] message was perfectly clear: the CAS had to 
be made more independent of the IOC both organizationally and financially,” wrote Matthieu 
Reeb, the CAS General Secretary.58 As a result, the CAS underwent three major reforms on June 




                                                 
53 See Straubel, supra note 16, at 1209.  
54 Gundel, supra note 47, at 570.  
55 Straubel, supra note 16, at 1209.  
56 Gundel, supra note 47, at 570. 
57 See James H. Carter, The Law of International Sports Disputes, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the Indian 
Society of International Law 4 (Nov. 2004) (available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/carterspeech0411.pdf) (noting that 
“[i]f the IOC had been a party, the result could have been different”).  
58 See Reeb, supra note 52, at xxvi. 
59 The Presidents of the IOC, Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF), the Association 
of International Winter Sports Federations (AIWF) and the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC) 
enacted these reforms when they signed the “Agreement concerning the constitution of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport” during a meeting in Paris. The agreement is widely known as the “Paris Agreement.” See id, 
at xxvi. 
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First Reform: IOC puts control of the CAS in the hands of ICAS.  
As the centerpiece of the 1994 Paris Agreement, a newly formed “International Council 
of Arbitration for Sport” (“ICAS”) replaced the IOC as the governing body of the CAS. 
Essentially, the IOC surrendered its total authority over the CAS and handed this power to ICAS.  
ICAS membership is both limited and prestigious; at any time, it has only twenty 
members who are “high level” judicial figures worldwide, appointed for renewable four-year 
terms.60 ICAS members cannot themselves participate in CAS arbitrations. Instead, their primary 
functions are to: a) adopt and amend the CAS Code, b) manage the court’s finances, c) manage 
the roster of CAS arbitrators, d) decide when to remove arbitrators from a case because a party 
objects, and e) appoint the Secretary General of the CAS.61 
 
Second Reform: The CAS expands its pool of arbitrators 
Second, the CAS greatly expanded its pool of arbitrators.62 Whereas the CAS originally 
had a maximum of sixty available arbitrators, redrafted CAS regulations now require a minimum 
of 150 active arbitrators appointed for renewable four-year terms.63 In fact, the CAS now 
employs 250 such jurists. These arbitrators are supposed to exhibit legal experience with sports 
issues, and should, if possible, hail from many different parts of the world.64 With this expanded 
roster, the CAS can better handle its burgeoning docket while also giving parties a wider 
selection of sports law experts to choose from.  
 
 
                                                 
60 See Carter, supra note 57, at 4.  
61 See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. S6.  
62 Carter, supra note 57, at 4.  
63 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. S13 & S18.  
64 Id. at art. S14 (legal competence), art. S16 (different continents). 
 15
Third Reform: The CAS expands its base of funding 
 Originally, the CAS was entirely bankrolled by the IOC. As a third reform, the CAS tried 
to sever its total financial dependence on the IOC by splitting CAS costs between Olympic sports 
federations, the IOC, National Olympic Committees, and private parties that used the CAS.65 
The CAS has diversified its funding, and several different organizations are now responsible for 
the CAS’ $4 million annual budget.66 
 
Part II: Is the CAS a Successful International Tribunal?  
To evaluate the CAS’ success as an international arbitral tribunal, we must examine the 
court along at least two dimensions.  
First, we must look at party preference for the tribunal. In order to be successful, the 
court must offer a superior dispute resolution method for potential parties, such that these parties 
will prefer the tribunal over the available alternatives (i.e. domestic courts or even self-help). If 
the tribunal cannot offer a better ‘product,’ so to speak, parties in conflict will simply go 
elsewhere, and the tribunal will be left with an empty courtroom and a non-existent docket. For 
example, over much of its early history, few nations were willing to submit “contentious issues” 
to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), and as a result, the ICJ’s docket was notably 
sparse.67 In the end, if parties do not believe that a tribunal will be sufficiently fair, efficient, or 
otherwise superior to other means of dispute resolution, that court will be a lonely place indeed.  
Along the second dimension, we must ask whether the tribunal in question is capable of 
performing effective speech acts (the “speech act dimension”). Namely, when the court speaks, 
                                                 
65 Carter, supra note 57, at 4. 
66 Henning, supra note 8, at 1. 
67 See, e.g., Heid K. Hubbard, Note, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Role for the 
International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 183 (1985) (noting that “the ICJ is almost never used”).  
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do people actually listen? The history of international dispute resolution is littered with cases 
where a transnational court issues a judgment that falls on deaf ears. For example, in United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ ordered Iran to release American 
hostages; Iran simply refused to comply.68 Other times, neither party respects the judgment, and 
ultimately end up negotiating an agreement that looks very different from the resolution dictated 
by the court; this is best typified by disputes heard by the World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement Body.69 For an international court to be successful, it must speak with words that 
have force.  
 
Part III: The CAS Along the First Dimension - Party Preference 
 The CAS rates highly along the first dimension, by virtue of its vast superiority over its 
alternatives for resolving Olympic sports disputes. Before the CAS became the single, supreme 
body for adjudicating Olympic disputes, these matters were handled in two different kinds of 
forums.  
Some disputes - usually disciplinary matters involving individual athletes - were handled 
by “in-house” panels.70 These panels decided: how to punish athletes for cheating during 
competition, whether an athlete was guilty of a doping infraction, whether an athlete was eligible 
to compete for a particular country. For example, after Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson famously 
tested positive for steroids at the 1988 Seoul Olympics, he vehemently denied ever using a 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 5.  
69 See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 794 (2001).  
70 See, e.g., Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for Olympic Ailments, 8 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 347, 352-53 (describing how internal hearings were used in the Reynolds case).  
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banned substance.71 An internal IOC panel adjudicated Johnson’s case, and decided to strip the 
Canadian of his gold medal after a few frantic hours of deliberation.72  
 Olympic disputes have also found their way into domestic courts around the world. For 
example, the Olympics experienced a wave of litigation in American courts prior to the 1984 Los 
Angeles Games.73 U.S. courts were asked to intercede in issues concerning athlete eligibility, 
adding new events, and changes to amateur rules.74 In more recent years, American courts were 
called on to adjudicate licensing disputes and employment discrimination claims, among other 
things.75 
Parties are drawn to the CAS because it retains most of the benefits offered by domestic 
courts and internal hearings, while eliminating the drawbacks. With the CAS, disputants get 
speed, uniformity, and authority. In addition, it also offers “public relations insurance” to the 
Olympic institutions. As such, the CAS is a “value-adding” institution.  
 
Domestic Courts Are Sub-Optimal for Resolving Sports Disputes 
 From the perspective of all sides, domestic courts have proven themselves to be ill-suited 
for handling Olympic disputes.  
 For Olympic institutions, domestic courts are essentially legal minefields, to be avoided 
at all cost. At the moment, 203 countries participate in the Olympic Movement; for comparison, 
                                                 
71 See Daniel Benjamin, Shame of the Games: Ben Johnson is Stripped of His Gold in the Olympic’ Worst Drug 
Scandal, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 74. 
72 See id.  
73 Samuel Pisar, The Olympics and the Law, OLYMPIC MESSAGE, June 1985, at 15-18.  
74 Id.  
75 See Jedrejcic v. Croat. Olympic Comm., 190 F.R.D. 60, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (action for breach of an exclusive 
licensing agreement between a New Jersey resident and the Croation Olympic Committee); Lee v. U.S. Taekwondo 
Union, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D.C. Haw. 2004) (coach claims that USA Taekwondo terminated him for 
discriminatory reasons).  
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even the United Nations can only claim a membership of 191 member states.76 Were the 
institutions of the Olympics subject to the laws and jurisdiction of every one of its 203 member 
nations, the entire enterprise could be paralyzed by conflicting laws and constant litigation. 
Olympic institutions, as a practical matter, simply cannot defend its myriad of decisions in the 
courts of every single member nation.77 Further, in-court litigation over sports disputes often lead 
to unpredictable and inefficient outcomes.78  
 For athletes, domestic courts are also far from ideal. It is true that domestic courts offer a 
“home field advantage” for athletes.79 They can litigate in their own nation, with fellow 
countrymen acting as judge or jury. But this advantage must be balanced against the considerable 
time, cost, and frustration endemic to domestic litigation. Further, even if an athlete is victorious 
in domestic court, there is no guarantee that powerful transnational bodies like Olympic 
institutions will even recognize or comply with the court’s decree.  
As such, it should come as no surprise that Olympic organizations go to great lengths to 
avoid being dragged into domestic courts, and athletes rarely take this route either. The case of 
American sprinter Butch Reynolds aptly illustrates just how domestic courts can be a negative 




                                                 
76 For a comprehensive list of U.N. Member States, see Press Release, U.N., List of Member States, U.N. Press 
Release ORG/1360/Rev.1 (Feb. 10 2004), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html. For an up-to-
date tally of nations participating in the Olympic Movement, see Organisation of NOCs, 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/noc/index_uk.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).  
77 See Craig A. Masback, Fairness and Finality: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Resolution of Dipsutes in 
International Sports 75 (Jan. 12, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
78 Id. at 58.  
79 See Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002 
ARMY LAW. 1, 3 (2002) (noting how domestic courts are not considered suitable for trying their own war criminals 
because the defendants may enjoy a “home field advantage”).  
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The Butch Reynolds Case: highlighting the unsuitability of domestic courts  
Butch Reynolds was considered one of the greatest sprinters of his time.80 Not only was 
he a multiple medal winner at the 1988 Olympics, but he also broke a twenty-year old world 
record in the 400 meters.81 Of course, the personal qualities that made Reynolds a track & field 
success story also predisposed him to be a ferocious courtroom litigant.82  Unfortunately, the 
IAAF did not fully appreciate this quality in Reynolds when it suspended him for two years 
following a failed drug test in 1990.83  
Had Reynolds accepted the IAAF ban, his could have been just another doping case. 
Instead, Reynolds hired a law firm and filed the first (of many) suits in U.S. federal district court 
in early 1991.84 Reynolds claimed that the IAAF falsely accused him of steroid use and 
wrongfully suspended him from competition.85 IAAF simply chose to ignore the federal case, 
perhaps incredulous that an eighty-seven year old senior judge in Reynolds’ hometown of 
Columbus, Ohio, could have jurisdiction over an international organization that spanned 204 
nations.86 Informed by the IAAF’s deafening silence, the district court sympathized with 
Reynolds’ argument. It first granted an injunction against the IAAF in June of 1992, allowing 
                                                 
80 See Ed Gordon, Reynolds Slashes WR to 43.29, TRACK & FIELD NEWS, Oct. 1988, at 24.  
81 See Masback, supra note 77, at 56-57.  
82 See id. at 57 (quoting Kenny Moore, Chasing the Dream, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 22, 1988, at 20, 22 
(“Quarter-milers are sprinters who must carry their speed. They succeed according to how well they practice a brutal 
fitness.”)).  
83 Reynolds tested positive for the anabolic steroid nandrolone after competing at the Herculis Meeting in Monte 
Carlo, Monaco, on August 12, 1990. See Masback, supra note 77, at 59.  
84 Reynold’s first suit was dismissed as a result of his failure to exhaust all the administrative remedies afforded to 
him by the IAAF. Reynolds v. The Athletic Cong. of the U.S.A., Inc., No. C-2-91-0003, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21191, at *11-12 (E.D. Ohio March 19, 1991).  
85 Reynolds eventually settled on the following claims: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of contractual due process; 
3) defamation; and 4) tortuous inference with business relations. Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 841 F. 
Supp. 1444, 1448 (E.D. Ohio 1992) (“Reynolds II”).  
86 Id. at 1455. See also Masback, supra note 77, at 60 (“Judge Joseph P. Kinneary, an eighty-seven year old on 
senior status, heard the case…”). As Masback points out, under Rules of Federal Procedure, IAAF could have filed a 
“special appearance” simply for the purposes challenging the court’s jurisdiction, and would have likely won on this 
issue. Id. at 76 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285-86 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1977).  
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Reynolds to compete in the United States. Judge Joseph Kinneary went on to award Reynolds a 
massive judgment for $27,356,008 for compensatory and punitive damages against the IAAF.87  
 At this point, Olympic officials finally sat up and took notice. Kinneary’s ruling simply 
stunned the Olympic Movement. In press releases, IAAF maintained that Reynolds was guilty of 
doping, and found it unfortunate that “the courts of Mr. Reynolds’ hometown” would rule in his 
favor.88 Perhaps more importantly, Reynolds’ courtroom victory did little to affect his ban 
worldwide; Reynolds was not allowed to compete abroad until 1993. IAAF also had no intention 
of actually paying Reynolds $27 million. As then-IAAF President Pablo Nebiolo was later 
quoted as saying, “’[n]ever, never. He [Reynolds] can live another 200 years’ and he’ll never 
collect any money.”89 
 Finally, in July of 1993 – months after Reynolds ban was over – IAAF appeared to 
appeal the $27 million judgment in U.S. federal court.90 This seemed to do the trick, as the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that the district court never had personal jurisdiction over the IAAF and threw out 
the award.91 After four years of wending its way through the federal system, the Reynolds case 
died due to a simple procedural matter that could, and probably should, have been dealt with at 
the outset. 
 The Reynolds case is a perfect example of how everyone can lose when sports disputes 
end up in the hands of domestic courts. Here, the IAAF and the Olympic Movement lost 
considerable credibility in its anti-doping program when the district court ruled in favor of 
                                                 
87 See Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1114 (6th Cir. 1994). District Judge Kinneary was 
merciless in his criticism of the IAAF, noting that it acted with “ill will and a spirit of revenge” towards Reynolds 
and with “spite and conscious disregard” for his rights. Id.  
88 See Harry “Butch” Reynolds, IAAF NEWS, Jan. 1993, at 5.  
89 See Masback, supra note 77, at 74 n.203 (quoting Kiss, Kiss, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 6, 1993, at 21-22).  
90 Judge Upholds Reynolds’ Award of $27 million, USA TODAY, July 14, 1993, at 7C.  
91 Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, supra note 87, at 1121.  
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Reynolds.92 And for Reynolds, domestic courts proved to be powerless, even in victory. Perhaps 
Reynolds enjoyed a “home field advantage” by bringing suit in Columbus, Ohio, with fellow 
Americans acting as judges. And Reynolds may have even enjoyed a moral victory by winning 
in district court, thus shining the media spotlight on the deficiencies plaguing IAAF’s drug-
testing regime.93 But on the other hand, Reynolds’ victory did nothing to change his lengthy ban 
from international competition, and he never received a dime in compensatory or punitive 
damages from the IAAF. No doubt, the litigation process was financially costly, and the outcome 
was in limbo for over four years. For an Olympic athlete, four years is practically a lifetime. 
Ultimately, this case proves that litigation in domestic courts is worse that a zero-sum 
proposition; it can be a negative-sum game for all parties involved. Given the hard lessons of the 
Reynolds case, it should come as no surprise that all sides involved in Olympic disputes 
generally disfavor domestic courts.  
 
Internal Hearings Are Sub-Optimal for Resolving Sports Disputes 
 Internal hearings are also sub-optimal for all parties involved. For athletes, an internal 
hearing is the nightmare scenario; their accusers also happen to be the prosecutor, judge, jury, 
and executioner. For Olympic institutions as well, internal hearings are far from ideal. By taking 
on final decision-making authority, Olympic institutions also expose themselves to public 
scrutiny and criticism of its judgments. Given the controversial nature of Olympic disputes, this 
exposure may just not be worth it.  
 
 
                                                 
92 See Dick Patrick, Reynolds’ Gain Puts Drug Testing, IAAF at a Loss, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 1991, at 4C.  
93 See Masback, supra note 77, at 81.  
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Why are internal hearings sub-optimal for athletes? 
For athletes, there are obvious disadvantages to having the international federation or 
other Olympic institution act as the final decision-maker, given that they are also the ones 
bringing charges against the athlete. This conflict was at the heart of the Ngugi Affair. In 
February of 1993, the IAAF banned Kenyan distance runner John Ngugi for four years after he 
refused to take a random drug test for an IAAF medical team that showed up at his home.94 
Ngugi was one of Kenya’s greatest distance runners, winning the 5000 meter gold at the 1988 
Olympics, along with five world cross country championships.95 Ngugi was also a soldier in the 
Kenyan army, and argued that Kenyan army regulations did not permit him to take a drug test 
without a superior officer present.96 The Kenya Amateur Athletic Federation agreed with Ngugi, 
and cleared him of the charges.97 But the IAAF internal panel refused to lift the ban.98  
Kenyan politicians led by Moses Wetangula, an MP from the ruling Kenyan African 
National Union, criticized the IAAF for high-handedness. Wetangula noted, “the IAAF was the 
complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge in the Ngugi trial.”99 Ngugi’s agent, John Bicourt, 
threatened to sue the IAAF if the ban was not lifted.100 Surely, athletes like John Ngugi have 
reason to complain when their principle accuser also holds the power to pass final judgment.  
 
Why are internal hearings sub-optimal for Olympic institutions? 
 Olympic institutions also have good reason to shy away from internal hearings, though 
their reasons for doing so are complex. The status quo before the CAS was for Olympic 
                                                 
94 Masback, supra note 77, at 18. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 19.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 IAAF’s dual roles attacked in Kenyan Parliament, ATHLETICS TODAY, June 23, 1993, at 6.  
100 See John Rodda, Ngugi Chases IAAF to Lift Ban and Pay, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 25, 1993, at 21.  
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institutions to resolve disputes using internal hearings. Olympic institutions maintained exclusive 
control over who sat on the panel, and thereby kept fairly strong control over the actual outcome 
of the dispute. For example, during the Olympic Games, each sport would empanel a “Jury of 
Appeal” to hear any dispute that might arise.101 Such juries were often comprised of the 
President of the international federation governing the sport, along with other high-ranking 
members of that Olympic institution.  
 As such, it may seem odd that Olympic institutions would want to voluntarily give up the 
power to control the outcome of cases. Observers of the CAS, in pondering this question, have 
suggested that Olympic institutions divested themselves of this final authority because they fear 
that domestic courts might overrule internal findings out of fairness concerns. For example, a 
court hearing the Ngugi case might accept the argument that the IAAF was simply too biased to 
be a fair judge of Ngugi’s guilt.   
However, this concern over domestic courts nullifying “unfair” internal hearings seems 
largely overblown. Prof. James Nafziger, an expert in international law, has noted that:  
 
Ordinarily, courts recognize and enforce rules and decisions of 
appropriate national governing bodies and Ifs [Olympic 
institutions]. Courts in the United States, for example, have been 
reluctant to find either express or implied rights of action in claims 
by individual athletes against national governing bodies and IFs. 
They therefore have generally deferred to private processes for 
resolving disputes. Courts are particularly reluctant to intervene in 
disciplinary hearings by private bodies.102 
 
                                                 
101 In fact, most sports still have a Jury of Appeal at the Games. However, the Jury is now only an intermediate 
appellate body, and its decisions are subject to final review by the CAS.  
102 James A.R. Nafziger, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: Dispute Resolution in the Arena of 
International Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 170 (2002).  
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A survey of U.S. case law supports Nafziger’s claim. Again and again, American courts have 
refused to overturn the results of internal hearings.103 Therefore, the threat of intrusive domestic 
courts does not appear to be a viable reason for Olympic institutions to prefer the CAS as 
opposed to its own internal review boards.  
 
Internal hearings come at great cost for Olympic institutions 
What observers of the CAS have thus far failed to appreciate is a far more subtle reason 
why internal hearings are unfavorable for Olympic institutions. The power to make final 
decisions comes at a significant cost: Olympic institutions must also be willing to endure the 
inevitable public criticism of their decisions, along with the possibility that that poorly received 
decisions will erode the legitimacy and popularity of the entire Olympic Movement.  
Consider a small selection of Olympic cases that were adjudicated “in-house,” before the 
IOC turned over final authority to the CAS: 
 
Olympic Controversies Adjudicated by Internal Panels 
• In 67 AD, the Roman emperor Nero competed in the Games’ chariot race. 
Unfortunately, he fell and failed to complete the course. The Jury of the Games, 
perhaps under some duress, declared Nero the victor anyway.104 
 
• In 1896, during the first modern Olympic Games, Greek bronze medalist Spiridon 
Belokas was stripped of his medal by Olympic organizers after it was alleged that he 
rode part of the marathon course in a carriage.105  
 
                                                 
103 See Jacobs v. U.S. Assoc. for Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004) (an athlete could not compel arbitration 
under commercial rules of arbitration); Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (court 
upheld the result of an IAAF arbitration panel); Reynolds, supra note 87, at 1121 (overturning an award for punitive 
damages against the IAAF for suspending the athlete for doping); Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 
(7th Cir. 1984) (court rules that the USOC could properly suspend the athlete after he tested positive for 
performance-enhancing drugs); Barnes v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 862 F.Supp. 1537 (S.D.W.Va 1993) (court 
dismissed suit against IAAF for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the athlete had failed to exhaust all 
administrative remedies).  
104 See Mike Barnes, Sports News, UPI, Sept. 27, 1988.  
105 See Jim Holden, Where Is the Appeal of Winning in Court?, SUNDAY EXPRESS, August 22, 2004, at 95.  
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• In 1960, American Lance Larson was controversially denied gold in the 100 meter 
freestyle swim, despite the fact that Larson had the fastest official time.106 The IOC 
Jury of Appeal turned down Larson’s protest, much to the anger of the American 
contingent, who for their part, protested for years afterwards.107  
 
• In 1968, Austrian skier Karl Schranz, competing in Grenoble, claimed that he should 
be declared the Olympic champion after a French soldier allegedly interfered with 
him on the course. Again, the IOC Jury of Appeal controversially denied Schranz’ 
request.108  
 
• In 1972, the United States basketball team lost the gold medal game to the Soviet 
Union, after the referee shockingly gave the Soviets three last-gasp chances to win the 
game. Three members of the IOC’s five-man Jury of Appeal were from Communist 
states, and all three voted to uphold the Soviet victory. With the 3-2 vote, the United 
States lost an Olympic basketball game for the first time. Out of protest, all the 
members of that team refused to accept their silver medals, which are still being held 
by the IOC.109 
 
• At the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korean boxer Park Si-Hun made it to the finals 
after four controversial wins (including one in which he disabled an opponent with a 
low blow to the kidney. In the final, he faced Roy Jones, Jr., an American who would 
go on to become one of the greatest professional fighters in history. Jones dominated 
all three rounds, landing 86 blows to Park’s 32. Despite this, in a decision called “the 
most offensive episode of judging in Olympic history,” three of the five judges 
awarded Park the gold medal.110 One coach claimed he saw a judge being offered a 
gold bar after the fight.111 Park himself even apologized to Jones afterwards for the 
egregious decision.112 However, the IOC upheld the controversial result, most 
recently in 1997 when it revisited the incident due to public pressure.113 
                                                 
106 Lance Larson appeared to edge John Devitt of Australia for first place in the 1960 100-metre freestyle. Devitt 
congratulated Larson and left the pool in disappointment. Larson's official time was 55.1 seconds and Devitt's was 
55.2 seconds. Of the three judges assigned the task of determining who finished first, two voted for Larson. 
However, the three second place judges also voted 2-1 for Larson. In other words, of the six judges, three thought 
Larson had won and three thought Devitt had won. The chief judge gave the victory to Devitt and four years of 
protests to the IOC failed to change the results. See David Wallechinsky & Amy Wallace, 10 Olympic 
Controversies, in THE BOOK OF LISTS (Canongate 2004).  
107 See Ian Thorley, When fractions of a second make all the difference, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), June 10, 2005, at 3.  
108 The IOC Jury’s decision was particularly controversial because, were Schranz declared the winner, he would 
have displaced Frenchman Jean-Claude Killy atop the medal stand, and also would have derailed Killy’s historic 
quest to sweep all three men’s alpine skiing events. The matter was portrayed as a conspiracy by the French to 
illegally boost their countryman’s chances of accomplishing the historic feat. See Jim Murray, Olympic Pressure 
Perfectly Amazing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10. 2006, at S11.  
109 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate 
Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 993, 1020 n. 94 (1999).  
110 Michael Wilbon, On Judgment Calls, Different Answers, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at D11.  
111 Christine Brennan, Seoul Bids Athletes Adieu; Olympics End With Revelry and Solemnity, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 
1988, at A1.  
112 Paul Majendie, There Are No Allies in Sports, TORONTO SUN, Aug. 22, 2004, at 7.  
113 George Vecsey, Nice Gesture Substitutes for Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at C1. 
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The ties that bind all of these controversies are that 1) there is no clear-cut, obvious resolution, 
and 2) no matter how the dispute is resolved, some faction will be very unhappy with the 
outcome. By retaining the authority to make final decisions on matters like this, Olympic 
institutions also must endure the inevitable criticism that will follow. For example, suppose the 
IOC stripped Park Si-Hun of his gold and handed it to Roy Jones, Jr. The host nation of South 
Korea would be outraged at the Olympic Committee. If the IOC kept the status quo (as it did), it 
would appease the South Koreans, but also infuriate millions of Americans (as it did). For the 
decision-maker, this is a classic “no-win” situation. Whatever the resolution, the fallout from a 
difficult decision like this inevitably caused a crisis of legitimacy in the Olympic Movement as a 
whole. To criticize the final judgment was also to criticize the Olympics itself.  
  
Why CAS Appeals to Potential Parties 
CAS is value-adding for Olympic institutions 
It is uncontroversial that Olympic institutions prefer the CAS to litigation in domestic 
courts. The CAS offers a uniform set of rules, while domestic courts require knowledge of the 
laws and procedures of hundreds of different member countries. The CAS is, in theory, neutral, 
while domestic courts are staffed by the countrymen of the athlete or party opposing the Olympic 
institution.  
However, what CAS observers have yet to understand is that for Olympic institutions, the 
court also solves a serious problem posed by internal hearings. Essentially, when Olympic 
institutions outsource final decision-making authority to the CAS, Olympic institutions also 
divest themselves of the inevitable criticism that will result from having to make these decisions. 
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The benefit of such ‘public relations insurance’ should not be underestimated. Consider the 
controversies that arose after the CAS was installed as the ‘supreme court for world sports:’   
 
Olympic Controversies During the CAS Era 
• In 1998, Canadian Ross Rebagliati won the first Olympic gold ever awarded in 
the sport of snowboarding.114 However, three days after his victory, it was 
revealed that Rebagliati had tested positive for marijuana in a subsequent drug 
test. Many were up in arms that Rebagliati could lose his medal because of a 
substance that – if it had any effect - probably hurt his performance. The IOC 
deferred to CAS for a final judgment on the matter.  
 
CAS, basing their decision on a technicality, quashed Regabliati’s 
disqualification, and ordered that his medal be returned.115  
 
• At the 2000 Sydney Games, Romanian gymnast Andreea Raducan was stripped of 
her gold medal after she tested positive for pseudoephedrine after her victory in 
the individual all-around competition. Her positive test was due to a cold 
medication she was accidentally given by her team physician, who assured her it 
was safe to use. Making matters even worse, Raducan said rather than give her an 
edge over her rivals, the medication had even made her feel dizzy.116 With public 
support growing behind her, the Romanian appealed to CAS for the return of her 
medal.117 For its part, the IOC said that it would abide by whatever decision CAS 
issued.  
 
CAS subsequently upheld the punishment, and was mercilessly criticized for 
doing so. One commentator noted, “[i]t surely is desirable that if an athlete like 
Andrea (sic) Raducan is morally innocent of doping, then…no penalty should be 
imposed.”118 Many observers noted that CAS’ decision seemed unduly harsh,119 
or simply “ludicrous.”120 
 
• In 2004, one of the most publicized incidents of the Athens Games was the 
gymnastics controversy involving American Paul Hamm and South Korean Yang 
Tae Young. Both were competing in the individual all-around event when a judge 
in the parallel bars routine incorrectly ranked the “start value” of Yang’s 
routine.121 As a consequence of this unfair, but unintentional error, Yang ended up 
                                                 
114 See Kevin Paul DuPont, Rebagliati gets to keep his gold, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1998, at E1.  
115 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 24, at 513.  
116 Court Supports IOC Over Raducan, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/olympics2000/gymnastics/ 
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119 Alex Wade, When will the world take a hard line on drugs?, TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 28, 2003, at 3.  
120 Alison Kervin, Raducan in from the cold, TIMES (LONDON), June 19, 2001.  
121 See Richard McLaren, International Sports Law Perspective: The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic 
Games, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175, 200 (2004).  
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receiving the bronze medal when he should have won gold.122 Paul Hamm was 
instead declared the victor.  
 
The result of this error was a near international incident between South Korea and 
the United States. U.S. Congressman James Sensenbrenner loudly championed 
Hamm’s cause, saying “[his] role in this is not just to prevent Paul Hamm from 
having the gold medal stolen from him but to ensure that no future athlete is ever 
put in the unfair position Paul Hamm has been placed in by these 
organizations.”123 For its part, Olympic officials took a middle-of-the-road 
approach. FIG President Bruno Grandi wrote to Hamm, stating that while Grandi 
could not change the results [read: Hamm was technically the gold medalist], he 
believed Yang was the true all-around champion.124 
 
Yang ultimately appealed to CAS for relief. CAS denied his application, and the 
fallout was swift and severe. As The Mirror of London wrote: “The court rejected 
[Yang’s] appeal on the bizarre grounds that it was filed too late. But we all know 
that if the roles were reversed and an American had been the wronged party in 
Greece, the South Korean gymnast would have had the gold medal ripped from 
his neck quicker than you could say 'stitch-up'.”125  
 
In the end, Olympic institutions are likely to be more or less indifferent to how a dispute between 
itself and an athlete turns out, when compared to how much they covet the health, popularity, 
and success of the Olympic Movement as a whole. The IOC awards hundreds of medals in any 
given Olympics, and at last count has issued 15,108 medals overall.126 Individual medals are, in 
this sense, cheap. But as an overall enterprise, the Olympic Movement itself is essentially a cash 
cow, worth billions on billion of dollars.127 
So by outsourcing final decision-making authority to the CAS in these inevitably 
unpopular, tricky cases, Olympic institutions are able to insulate themselves from the criticism 
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123 See Jill Lieber, Congressman rips USOC in Hamm controversy, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2004, at 2C.   
124 See id. 
125 Oliver Holt, Ham-Fisted Gold Robbery, MIRROR (LONDON), Nov. 3, 2004, at 49.  
126 See Olympics Games, http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/index_uk.asp (last visited April 20, 2006) (author 
calculation).  
127 The IOC will take in $3.5 billion in television revenues for the 2010 Winter Games and the 2012 Summer 
Games. The IOC also will take in $866 million in marketing revenue for 2005-2009. Every Olympics since the 1984 
Los Angeles Games has turned an operating profit. See Lynn Zinser, Costly Race Reaches Its Frenzied Finish, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2006, at D1.  
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that is sure to follow. Olympic officials can essentially foist any blame on the CAS. This is 
perhaps best evidenced by the aftermath of the CAS’ controversial decision in the Raducan case. 
IOC President Jacques Rogge, in a classic ‘sorry, my hands are tied’ moment, commented, “this 
is one of the worst experiences I have had in my Olympic life. Having to strip the gold medal 
from the individual gymnastic champion for something she did not intentionally do is very 
tough. But the rules are the rules.”128 Rogge was able to appear at once magnanimous, but also 
grudgingly beholden to the final interpretation of the “rules” by an independent, international 
court. For Rogge and the IOC, this was perhaps the most comfortable position of all.129  
 
Why CAS is value-adding for athletes 
 At the most brutal level of analysis, athletes consent to CAS jurisdiction because they 
simply have no choice in the matter. Before competing in the Games, athletes must sign an Entry 
Form which states that any dispute will go to the CAS for “final and binding arbitration.”130 If 
athletes hesitate to waive their right to sue in domestic court, Olympic institutions respond with 
intense pressure.131 Ultimately, athletes that refuse to sign are simply excluded from the 
Games.132  
However, regardless of the relatively involuntary nature of athletes’ consent, the CAS is 
still preferable to domestic courts and internal hearings from the athlete’s perspective. The CAS 
is, in theory, a neutral court that may be more receptive to the arguments of athletes than internal 
                                                 
128 See id.  
129 In many ways, the IOC’s wisdom in outsourcing final decision-making authority is analogous to a corporation 
that hires an outside consulting firm to handle downsizing. Rather than have remaining and former employees upset 
at the corporation itself, the business can redirect any blame or criticism onto the outside consulting company that 
made the decision of who to keep and who to fire.  
130 See Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the Process Better or 
Worse for “Job Security,” 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 655, 663 (1998).  
131 Mark Fish, IAAF Talking Tough in Johnson Case, ATL. J. & CONST., May 18, 1996, at E9 (even an athlete as 
popular and powerful as Michael Johnson could not avoid signing the CAS clause).  
132 See id.  
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hearing panels. In fact, there have been several instances where the CAS has surprised many by 
ruling in favor of athletes.133 
And unlike domestic courts, the CAS is fast, cheap, and efficient.134 It usually decides 
cases within four months after an application is filed with the court. Further, unlike domestic 
courts, when the CAS rules in favor of an athlete, Olympic institutions are generally willing to 
respect the outcome.135 As such, the CAS offers aspects that appeal to athletes as well.  
 
 
Table 1: How Does CAS Stack Up to Domestic Courts and Internal Hearings? 
Party Domestic Courts Internal Hearings CAS 






+ Retain overt control 
over outcome 










Disadvantages - Slow 
- Costly 
- Requires knowledge of 
   local law 
- Must deal with hometown 
   judges 
- Exposure to public 
criticism over decisions 
None 










Disadvantages - Slow 
- Costly 
- Lack of finality 
- Biased panel 
- Prosecutor is also 
judge, jury, executioner 




                                                 
133 See, e.g., R. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS ad hoc Div. (O.G. Nagano 1998), reprinted in DIGEST OF CAS 
AWARDS I 1986-1998 419 (Matthieu Reeb ed., Kluwer 1998) (returning a gold medal to an athlete who tested 
positive for marijuana).  
134 See Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitration for Sport, 8 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS L. 75, 88 (1998) (noting that CAS is affordable, fast, and for the most part, fair). 
135 The question of why parties comply with CAS judgments is considered in more depth by Part IV of this paper. 
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Ultimately, the CAS succeeds because it preserves most of the advantages of other forms of 
dispute resolution, while minimizing or outright eliminating the drawbacks. In this sense, the 
CAS is theoretically a value-adding institution for both athletes and Olympic institutions alike.  
 
A Looming Threat to the CAS’ Value-Adding Status – Questions About CAS 
Independence 
 However, lingering doubts about the CAS’ neutrality may undermine the CAS’ 
universally value-adding nature. Specifically, some athletes and observers complain that, in spite 
of the reforms following the Gundel case in 1994, the CAS remains heavily biased in favor of 
Olympic institutions.136 There appears to be at least some merit to this claim, as Olympic bodies 
continue to exercise a great deal of influence in the workings of the CAS. 
 
Olympic institutions continue to influence ICAS 
Prior to 1994, the IOC exercised direct oversight of the CAS.137 After the Paris 
Agreement, however, ICAS was created to take on this duty. However, Olympic institutions are 
still very much in the picture, retaining substantial influence over both the ICAS appointment 




                                                 
136 See, e.g., Straubel, supra note 16, at 1232 (speculating that CAS will develop “doctrine that favors governing 
bodies, over time stacking the deck against an athlete.”). Athletes have expressed serious doubts about CAS’ 
neutrality. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 8.  
137 See Straubel, supra note 16, at 1209.  
138 See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, art. S4. See also, A. & B. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra 
note 17, at 3.3.1.   
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Table 2: How are ICAS members selected?  





4 members None (ICAS member can also be an officer or 
member of the IOC) 
International Sports 
Federations 
4 members None (ICAS member can also be an officer or 
member of an international sports federation) 
National Olympic Committees 4 members None (ICAS member can also be an officer or 
member of a National Olympic Committee) 
12 Members of ICAS 
Appointed Above 
4 members “After appropriate consultation with a view 
towards safeguarding the interests of athletes” 
16 Members of ICAS 
Appointed Above 
4 members ICAS members must be independent of the 
IOC, international sports federations, or 
national Olympic committees.  
 
Based on its membership requirements, there are four ways that ICAS (and therefore the CAS) 
remains firmly entangled with Olympic institutions. First, Olympic institutions directly appoint 
60% (12 out of 20 total) of all CAS governors. Second, the twelve ICAS members appointed by 
Olympic institutions have sole discretion in appointing the remaining eight members. Third, up 
to sixteen members of ICAS can, and mostly are, members of Olympic institutions. In fact, at 
last check, twelve current members of ICAS are also high ranking members of some Olympic 
institution.139 Finally, there is no life tenure in ICAS; members are only guaranteed a four-year 
term. If their appointing body (most likely, an Olympic institution) is not satisfied with their 
performance after four years, Olympic bodies can simply refuse to re-appoint a recalcitrant 
member. Assuming that the Paris Agreement was intended to truly emancipate CAS from 




                                                 
139 See Court of Arbitration for Sport, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/membres/frmmemb.htm (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006). 
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Olympic institutions continue to directly influence CAS 
The make-up of the CAS’ pool of 250 arbitrators also remains heavily influenced by 
Olympic institutions. Under the CAS Code, ICAS must select arbitrators based on the following 
distribution:140 
 
Table 3: How Are CAS Members Selected?  
Nominating Body Number of Arbitrators Conditions 
International Olympic 
Committee 
1/5th must be nominated 
by the IOC 
None (arbitrator can also be an officer or 
member of the IOC) 
International Sports 
Federations 
1/5th must be nominated 
by international sports 
federations  
None (arbitrator can also be an officer or 




1/5th must be nominated 
by National Olympic 
Committees 
None (arbitrator can also be an officer or 
member of a National Olympic 
Committee) 
ICAS 1/5th  Arbitrator must be independent of the 
IOC, IFs, or NOCs.  
ICAS 1/5th  Arbitrator chose with “a view to 
safeguarding the interests of the athletes.”  
 
Based on these figures, it is apparent how Olympic institutions leave their imprint on the CAS. 
Three-fifths of all CAS arbitrators are directly nominated by an Olympic institution. The same 
three-fifths can be, and often are, members or officers of Olympic institutions as well. Finally, 
ICAS, a body already heavily influenced by Olympic institutions, is allowed to pick the 
remaining arbitrators. Though Olympic institutions are no longer in direct control of who gets 
selected as a CAS arbitrator, significant ties persist.  
 
The CAS remains heavily funded by Olympic institutions 
 The 1994 Paris Agreement was also supposed to reduce the CAS’ financial dependence 
on Olympic institutions. As the Swiss Federal Tribunal reasoned in the Gundel case, it would be 
                                                 
140 Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 22, at art. S14. 
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hard for a court to be impartial in a case involving its primary financial benefactor. As such, the 
CAS’ $4 million annual budget is now funded according to the following formula:141 
 
Table 3: Who Pays for CAS/ICAS? 
Source of Funding Amount of Funding 
International Olympic 
Committee 
4/12th of CAS budget 
Summer Olympic 
International Federations 
3/12th of CAS budget 
Winter Olympic 
International Federations 
1/12th of CAS budget 
National Olympic 
Committees 
4/12th of CAS budget  
Private Parties  Based on usage 
 
The CAS is also essentially subsidized by its arbitrators, who are limited to only charging a 
nominal hourly rate, currently pegged at 135 euros per hour.142 
 As far as achieving independence, this funding scheme is a minor improvement over the 
situation where the CAS was utterly dependent on one frequent litigant (the IOC) for financial 
survival.143 Now, the CAS is almost completely dependent on four frequent litigants for financial 
viability. The value of ‘diversifying’ funding in this manner seems doubtful at best. The IOC still 
provides one-third of the CAS’ total budget. The other two-third is still paid by some Olympic 
institution.  If the CAS is at all motivated to keep its deep-pocketed patrons satisfied, serious 





                                                 
141 A. & B. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 17, at 3.3.1. 
142 See id.  
143 See id. at 3.3.3.2. 
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The Future for CAS Along the First Dimension 
The IOC has, in the past, claimed that all legal experts agree that the CAS is fair and 
impartial.144 This claim is patently false; many scholars around the world remain skeptical.145 
And the IOC’s protestations are probably of little comfort to athletes themselves. Imagine if a 
large corporation established a grievance panel, one that was supposed to independently settle 
any disputes that might arise between the corporation and its workers. One would be hard-
pressed to think that the panel would be fair and balanced if 1) the corporation installs its own 
officers in half of the seats, and 2) subsequently allows those sitting panelists (its own officers) 
to pick the other half of the panel “with a view to safeguarding the interests of workers.” If I 
were a worker for this corporation, I would expect the final grievance panel to look like a 
‘stacked deck.’  
Legally speaking, athletes appear to have limited recourse for challenging the fairness of 
the CAS. When the Swiss Federal Tribunal considered the issue in 2001, it strongly concluded 
that the 1994 reforms were sufficient to separate the CAS from the IOC.146  
Instead, if the athletes’ grumbling over the CAS’ lack of impartiality grows louder, and 
other forms of dispute resolution appear more and more attractive as a consequence, we might 
expect to see athletes take ‘extra-legal’ steps to remedy the situation. To this end, several athletes 
and commentators have already suggested that Olympic athletes unionize.147 This way, athletes 
                                                 
144 See id. at 3.3.2. 
145 MARK SCHILLIG, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT VON SPORTVERBANDEN IN DER SCHWEIZ 157 (1999); MARGERETA 
BADDELEY, L’ASSOCIATION SPORTIVE FACE AU DROIT 272 n.79 (1994); Dietmar Hantke, Brauchen wir eine Sport- 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit?,  SPURT, 1998, at 187; One scholar has described the reforms as a “Symptombekampfung” 
which does nothing to change the fundamental problem (Schillig, p. 159).   
146 See A. & B. v. IOC, supra note 17, at 3.3.3.2.  
147 See Straubel, supra note 16, at 1232 (“one unique solution…is the creation of monitoring groups comprised of 
athletes and athletes’ attorneys, perhaps akin to a union.”); Edward Hollis III, The United States Olympic Committee 
and the Suspension of Athletes: Reforming Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 71 IND. 
L.J. 183, 194 (1995); Joe Drape, Track War Likely Leading to Union, ATL. J. & CONST., Dec. 4, 1994, at H5. 
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can gain greater leverage in protecting their rights, thereby demanding a voice in the CAS 
appointment process.148 
 
Part IV: The CAS Along the Second Dimension: Effective Speech Acts 
Party preference is only one dimension along which to evaluate the CAS’ success as an 
international tribunal. We must also consider how effective the CAS is at actually delivering 
judgments that have force.  
Speech act theory provides a straightforward way to evaluate the CAS along this second 
dimension. The theory, perhaps most associated with philosophers J.L. Austin and John Searle, 
has been broadly used to evaluate problems in international adjudication.149 Speech act theory 
aims to do justice to the fact that even though our words encode information, we do more things 
with words than merely convey information.150 When we speak, we do not just describe; we 
speculate, request, and demand, for example. And perhaps most germane to the CAS, we can 
also declare and create; Searle called these “performatives of declaration.”151  
For example, one of Searle’s favorite examples of a performative declaration happens 
when a priest utters the words, “I pronounce you man and wife” at a wedding.152 By speaking 
those words, the priest is doing much more than simply describing a state of affairs. Rather, the 
priest is in fact altering the state of affairs to fit his words. By speaking, he actually joins the 
man and the wife and creates the bond of matrimony. Similarly, when an umpire in a baseball 
                                                 
148 See Straubel, supra note 16, at 1232.  
149 See, generally, DICK W.P. RUITER, INSTITUTIONAL LEGAL FACTS, LEGAL POWERS AND THEIR EFFECTS (Deventer 
1993). 
150 Ken Bach, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://www.rep.routledge.com (last visited May 
9, 2006).  
151 JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 26 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1985).  
152 Robert M. Harnish, Are Performative Utterances Declarations?, in SPEECH ACTS, MIND, AND SOCIAL REALITY 
60 (Gunther Grewendorf & Georg Meggle ed. Springer 1998).  
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game yells, “he’s out!” after a play at the plate, the umpire effectively makes the runner “out” by 
virtue of the spoken words.153 It hardly matters whether the runner actually touched the base 
before the ball arrived; the umpire’s final pronouncement makes the runner “out” nonetheless.154 
To use Searle’s semi-serious phrase, the priest and the umpire alike has a “quasi-magical power” 
to make the world fit his statement.155  
Of course, not anyone can invoke these words and change the world in any meaningful 
way. Suppose, for example, that a raving lunatic spotted a man and woman walking down the 
street, and screamed “I pronounce you man and wife!” Such an utterance would certainly not be 
effective, beyond perhaps upsetting the couple. Suppose a belligerent fan in the stands of a 
baseball game yelled, “he’s safe!” The game would continue unaltered and the runner would still 
be out.156 In this way, the lunatic and the fan make attempts at performative declarations that 
simply fail to “get off the ground.”157  
 
Speech Acts and the Law 
Searle himself thought of judicial declarations as a quintessential performative 
declaration. For him, it was obvious that a judge who declares, “I find you [the defendant] 
guilty” is on par with the priest or the umpire, as opposed to the raving lunatic or the belligerent 
                                                 
153 This is, of course, assuming that the umpire is upheld on appeal to the head umpire.  
154 Searle, supra note 151, at 19.  
155
 JOHN R. SEARLE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE 170 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).  
156 Of course, fans may cause the judge to reconsider. For example, at the 2004 Olympics, those attending the men’s 
gymnastics competition were shocked when judges gave Russian Alexei Nemov (a.k.a “Sexy Alexei”) a low score 
after he completed a revolutionary high bar routine. Fans were so irate that their jeers caused a ten-minute delay in 
the competition, and forced the judges to revise their score. See Joy Goodwin, The Athletes Shouldn’t Take the Fall, 
WASH. POST, August 29, 2004, at B1.  
157 Searle, supra note 151, at 18. 
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fan. However, what Searle perhaps failed to appreciate was just how often judicial declarations 
fail to “get off the ground.”158  
 Looking internationally, scores of ‘declared’ war criminals continue to go unpunished, 
despite having been branded guilty of atrocities. For example, in 1995, Croatian police officer 
Josip Budimcic was, in absentia, declared a war criminal by a Croatian court. Budimcic was 
convicted of torturing and executing prisoners while a member of the Serbian paramilitary police 
in 1991.159 The only problem is, he, like at least seventy-two other convicted war criminals, are 
currently living in Canada, with little chance of being extradited.160 Merely being declared a war 
criminal has done little to impact the life of Budimcic, who continues to work as a handyman in 
British Columbia.161  
The ICJ is also familiar with failed speech acts. Although Article 94(1) of the Charter of 
the United Nations obliged every state “to comply with the decisions of the International Court 
of Justice in any case to which it is a party,”162 several states have refused to obey adverse court 
rulings.163 Albania refused to pay reparations to Great Britain in the Corfu Channel case.164 Iran 
disregarded the Court's order to refrain from nationalizing a British corporation pending a final 
judgment of the Court or agreement between the parties in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.165 Iceland 
refused to obey an order not to enforce a 50-mile fishing zone until the Court ruled on suits 
brought by West Germany and the United Kingdom in Fisheries Jurisdiction.166 Iran rejected the 
                                                 
158 Searle, supra note 151, at 18.  
159 Juliet O’Neill, Lacking Conviction, OTTAWA CITIZEN, April 13, 2002. 
160 Id.  
161 Norman Gidney, War-crimes conviction in absentia was bogus, Croatian suspect maintains, MONTREAL 
GAZETTE, November 11, 2005.  
162 See Mark Weston Janis, Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. United States, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 144, 
145 (1987). 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
 39
ICJ's Order and Judgment that it release the American hostages in Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff.167 The United States ignored the Court's ruling in Military and Paramilitary Activities.168  
 Even the U.S. Supreme Court is vulnerable to failed speech acts. For example, in 1832, 
the Court decided in Worcester v. Georgia that Cherokees living in Georgia could not have their 
land seized from them by the state government.169 As legend has it, U.S. President Andrew 
Jackson – no friend to the Cherokee - responded by announcing, “John Marshall has made his 
decision; now let him enforce it.”170 Jackson would subsequently write about the Worcester case: 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find 
that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate... If orders 
were issued tomorrow one regiment of militia could not be got to 
march to save [the Cherokee] from destruction and this the 
opposition know, and if a collision was to take place between them 
and the Georgians, the arm of the government is not sufficiently 
strong to preserve them from destruction.171 (emphasis added) 
 
Jackson eventually did send troops, but those troops were sent to evict the Cherokees.172 
What these “still born” speech acts have in common is that they require an extensive 
alliance of extra-linguistic institutions to animate the judicial declaration with authority. In the 
case of Josip Budimcic, the Canadian government must also extradite the declared war criminal, 
and Serbia officials must also be willing to imprison him. When the ICJ ordered that Iran release 
American hostages, its words fell still-born without backing from the U.N. Security Council. In 
                                                 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
170 See Stephen Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 413-14 (2000). 
171 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial 
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 400 n.269 (1998) (quoting Letter from Andrew Jackson to Brigadier-General 
John Coffee (Apr. 7, 1832), in 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 429, 430 (John Spencer Bassett ed. 
1927)).  
172 See Breyer, supra note 170, at 413-14.  
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Worcester v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s words were just ink on paper after the President 
refused to animate them with the police power of the United States.    
 
Evaluating the CAS’ Speech Acts 
 Does the CAS rise above this deficiency? If we examine the CAS using speech act 
theory, it becomes clear that the court does in fact enjoy the power to effectively change the 
world with its mere words. There are two reasons for this. First, the most high-profile CAS cases, 
those involving the disposition of Olympic medals, are particularly amenable to resolution by 
speech acts. Second, in other kinds of CAS cases (namely disciplinary and commercial disputes), 
the CAS is able to effectively harness the necessary extra-linguistic institutions by leveraging the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
“New York Convention”).  
 However, we will also see that the CAS must still tread carefully, as it is still vulnerable 
to having its speech acts fail. Namely, as the CAS relies on broader and broader networks of 
extra-linguistic institutions to give force to the tribunal’s words, it increases the chances that its 
speech acts will fail.   
 
The CAS’ High Profile Cases are Particularly Amenable to Speech Acts 
The CAS derives part of its success from the fact that its most high profile disputes are 
unusually amenable to ‘speech act’ treatment. When the CAS is asked to resolve a dispute 
regarding the disposition of Olympic medals, it deals with a unique kind of dispute that can be 
resolved through speech alone. Consider, for example, the case of Jerome Young. 
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 Jerome Young was a U.S. sprinter who was a member of the gold-medal winning 1600 
meter relay team at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.173 Unfortunately for him, Young also tested 
positive for steroids. As part of the fallout from Young’s doping conviction, on July 20, 2005, 
the CAS ruled that because Young should never have run at the Sydney Games, he should 
therefore be stripped of his gold medal.174 Normally at this point, duly chastened athletes simply 
return the medal to Olympic officials.175  
However, a very curious thing happened. That is, Jerome Young simply said no. He 
scoffed at the notion that anyone would take his gold medal away, even going so far as to have 
his lawyer proclaimed that, “they [Olympic officials] can knock on my door and they will not 
receive it.”176 Olympic officials were at a loss, as they had no legal right to search Young or his 
whereabouts in hopes of finding and seizing the medal. A lawsuit against Young also was 
deemed overly costly and likely fruitless, given that Young was both destitute and “essentially 
homeless.”177 
 When a party refuses to comply with an ICJ decision, for example, it is considered a 
serious threat to the ICJ’s very legitimacy. But Young’s refusal to hand back his medal never 
caused anyone to worry about CAS’ impending demise. Why?  
Because the most important thing to note about these medal disputes is that they hardly 
have anything to do with possession. What Young failed to grasp, and what makes him such a 
tragic, King Lear-esque figure, is that the physical medal itself means almost nothing, once 
                                                 
173 The Young case is discussed in far greater detail later in this paper. 
174 U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 2005) (on file with author).   
175 On two previous occasions, U.S. Olympic medalists had been asked to return their medals. In 1912, Jim Thorpe 
returned his decathlon gold medal because it was later discovered that he did not meet the IOC’s strict definition of 
an “amateur athlete.” In 1972, swimmer Rick DeMont returned his gold medal from the Munich Games after his 
asthma medication resulted in a positive drug test. See Alan Abrahamson, Young Must Return Medal: IOC orders 
sprinter to give back gold he won as part of 1,600-relay team, which he won a year after positive test. His agent 
refuses, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at D1.  
176 Id.   
177 Id.  
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stripped of the fact that it is a totem for being the official ‘Olympic medalist.’ In cold material 
terms, the financial value of the actual gold medal pales in comparison to the earning power of 
being “the gold medal winner.” For example, it is reported that gold medals from the 2004 
Athens Games contained less than $100 worth of gold.178 In comparison, ‘the gold medal 
winner’ - not the ‘gold medal holder’ - has the potential to earn millions in endorsement 
dollars.179 
However, being an ‘Olympic medalist’ is much more than just a financial boondoggle. 
As Justice John Paul Stevens eloquently noted, “[a] decent respect for the incomparable 
importance of winning a gold medal in the Olympic Games convinces me that a pecuniary award 
is not an adequate substitute for the intangible values for which the world’s greatest athletes 
compete.”180 (emphasis added) The metaphysical value to which Justice Stevens refers, that of 
being the true and legitimate Olympic champion, cannot be fully embodied by a mere circlet of 
metal, any sum of money, or any other physical form. What really matters, being a ‘gold 
medalist,’ is a social fact, not a physical one.  
And this status is precisely what the CAS can strip away with a mere utterance. If the 
CAS makes a performative declaration invested with enough authority - something along the 
lines of, “Geoff is the gold medal winner” and its correlate, “Jerome is NOT the gold medal 
winner” – this is, in and of itself, enough to accomplish all meaningful ends. Nothing more needs 
to be done in order to make Geoff “the gold medal winner,” and remove Jerome’s status as “the 
gold medal winner.” No nation or organization needs to dispatch enforcers to pry the medal from 
Sam’s hands. Through its words, the CAS has already stripped the medal he holds of any 
                                                 
178 Winning gold could mean jackpot for athletes, AP, Aug. 19, 2004.  
179 See Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Gold Futures Rise: But Not All Olympic Winners Get Big-Money Deals, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 15, 2005, at. D1.  
180 Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1992).  
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symbolic or totemic value; at best, it only stands as a pathetic symbol of Young’s delusions of 
grandeur.  
To put it another way, the CAS, with its words alone, wields the “quasi-magical” power 
to transmutate the item Jerome Young holds from a coveted ‘medal’ to a mere piece of ‘metal.’  
In this way, the CAS is dramatically different from less successful tribunals. For 
example, compare the CAS’ relatively easy task in the Young case to the daunting challenge 
faced by the ICJ in Diplomatic and Consular Staff. When the ICJ unequivocally ordered Iran to 
release its hostages, the words perhaps had some symbolic effect.181 However, this was hardly 
enough to actually bring the hostages back to American soil. A physical state of affairs is at the 
crux of the dispute. And the ICJ, with words alone, could not effectively deliver the hostages 
from the possession of their captors.  
 
The CAS and recent medal decisions  
The CAS has gone on to wield its self-contained authority over medal disputes in several 
high profile cases. The 2004 Athens Olympic Games involved three such disputes: 
• The first case involved South Korean gymnast Yang Tae-Young and American Paul 
Hamm. During the Men's Individual Gymnastics Artistic All-Around Event Final, a judge 
in the parallel bars routine incorrectly ranked the starting value of the Korean gymnast's 
routine. As a consequence, the “start value” of his routine was 9.9 when it should have 
been 10.0. Yang won the bronze, but had the additional 0.10 been added to his total score 
he would have finished in first place ahead of Hamm.182  
 
Yang argued that the final score should be adjusted to reflect this unfair, though 
unintentional error, and as such, CAS should declare Yang the gold medal winner. Hamm 
countered that Yang should have protested the scoring error at the time of competition, 
and that it was too late to change the results.  
 
• The second case involved the Canadian gymnast Kyle Shewfelt. Gymnastics Canada, on 
behalf of Shewfelt, challenged the decision of the FIG with respect to the rankings of the 
                                                 
181 See Janis, supra note 162, at 145. 
182 See McLaren, supra note 121, at 200. 
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men's vault final. Gymnastics Canada claimed that the FIG did not evaluate the 
performance of Marian Dragulescu, who finished third, in accordance with its rules. The 
appeal requested that CAS declare Shewfelt, not Dragulescu, the true bronze medalist.183 
 
• The third case involved Brazilian runner Vanderlei Cordeiro de Lima, who led the 
Olympic marathon only three miles from the finish when he was grabbed by a deranged 
spectator. De Lima was able to break free and continue the race but finished third. The 
Brazilian Olympic Committee and de Lima asked that CAS declare de Lima the gold 
medal winner in order to remedy the damages he suffered in the marathon race.184 
 
Speech Act Analysis and Other Kinds of CAS Disputes 
 Of course, the CAS arbitrates more than just the disposition of Olympic medals. The 
CAS also handles a myriad of lower-profile matters, like commercial disputes and appeals from 
doping suspensions. Admittedly, in these non-medal disputes, the CAS looks much more like a 
traditional tribunal, in the sense that it requires an extensive alliance of extra-linguistic 
institutions in order to make the CAS’ speech acts effective. For example, suppose the CAS 
declares that Nike owes the IAAF $10 million in endorsement fees. The court, by itself, cannot 
transfer $10 million from Nike to the IAAF. Instead, it requires either 1) that Nike will 
voluntarily carry out the CAS’ order, or failing that, 2) countries where Nike has assets will use 
their police power to force Nike to comply. In the doping context, if the CAS declares that Sam 
cannot be punished for doping, the court relies on Olympic bodies to rescind their bans, pursuant 
to the CAS’ decision.  
 
The CAS and the New York Convention  
 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the “New York Convention”) is a powerful tool that the CAS uses to expand its alliance 
of supporting extra-linguistic institutions. In the 137 nations that have signed the New York 
                                                 
183 See id. at 202. 
184 See id. at 203-04. 
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Convention, the domestic courts are bound to both respect and enforce the decisions of an 
arbitral body like the CAS.185 
Essentially, the New York Convention harnesses the enforcement power of individual 
states and puts it at the disposal of the CAS. Specifically:  
 
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding 
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid 
down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed 
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on 
the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this 
Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or 
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.186 
 
This is a qualified grant of power. Under certain circumstances, domestic courts still can review 
and refuse to enforce CAS judgments. However, the Convention does not make it easy for 
parties to challenge an arbitral judgment. The unsatisfied party can do so in the country where 
the arbitration was held (the primary enforcement jurisdiction), or in a country where the award 
might be enforced (the secondary enforcement jurisdiction).187 A successful challenge to an 
arbitral decision in the primary jurisdiction annuls the award in all 137 countries that signed the 
Convention. A successful challenge in any secondary jurisdiction only annuls the decision in that 
particular country.188  
                                                 
185 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, there are 137 signatories to the New York 
Convention as of January 30, 2006. See Parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/ny-convention/parties.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2006).  
186 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
art. 1, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, SUPP. 29 (J. 
Paulsson ed., 1999) (each signatory state must recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforceable, as long as the 
award meets certain procedural requirements). 
187 Id. at art. V. See also, Masback, supra note 77, at 77.  
188 See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 113-114 
(Duke Univ. Press 1992). 
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 Whichever jurisdiction a party chooses, the New York Convention severely limits the 
grounds to challenge an arbitral judgment. Article V of the Convention lists seven such 
grounds:189  
 
1) The original agreement to submit to arbitration was not valid; 
2) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper opportunity to present 
a defense; 
3) The arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction in hearing the case and making the award; 
4) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties; 
5) The award is not yet binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended in the 
country in which the award was made; 
6) The subject matter of the matter in dispute is not capable of settlement under the law of 
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought; 
7) The enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought. This is the so-called “public policy 
defense.”190 
 
However, domestic courts have generally been reluctant to overturn a foreign arbitral award on 
any of these grounds. American courts, for example, have consistently upheld foreign arbitral 
awards executed under the New York Convention in commercial disputes.191 In Olympic 
disputes, courts have been even more unlikely to intercede. In the case of Slaney v. Int’l Amateur 
Athletic Fed’n, for example, U.S. middle-distance runner Mary Decker Slaney challenged the 
decision of an IAAF arbitral panel that suspended her for doping in federal district court.192 She 
claimed that: 
                                                 
189 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 186, at 
art. V(1)(A-E).  
190 See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975).  
191 See, e.g., Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 165 F. 3d 310 (2d Cir. 1998) (The court upheld a 
foreign arbitral award despite claims by one party that the underlying contract at issue was forged by the other 
party); La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le Transport, La Transformation et la 
Commericialisation Des Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natural Res., Co., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court 
rejected a party’s attempt to defeat a foreign arbitral award on antitrust-based policy grounds.); Fotochrome, Inc. v. 
Copal Co., supra note 190, at 516 (noting that the public policy defense is exceedingly narrow.). 
192 Specifically, a UCLA laboratory found elevated levels of testosterone in Slaney’s urine sample. Slaney v. Int’l 
Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2001).  
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1) the IAAF denied her a meaningful opportunity to present her case,193 and 
2) the standard for excessive testosterone levels was scientifically invalid, discriminatory 
towards female athletes, and violated the most basic notions of morality and justice. As 
such, the arbitral award against her violated the public policy of the United States.194 
The Seventh Circuit summarily rejected all of Slaney’s arguments, and concluded that the court 
was obliged to recognize her doping suspension under the terms of the New York Convention.195 
 As the Slaney case illustrates, the New York Convention theoretically allows the CAS to 
speak with authority in a wide array of commercial and disciplinary matters. Its ability to, say, 
order Nike to pay the IOC $10 million dollars is empowered to the extent that an American court 
could force Nike to do so. Its ability to ban an athlete from competition has force insofar as 
domestic courts can compel event organizers to bar that athlete. The Convention ultimately 
allows the CAS to harness the police power of individual states, and thereby compel individual 
parties to carry out the dictates of the court. As such, even with statements that require a rather 
broad network of extra-linguistic institutions in order to have force, the CAS can feel fairly 
confident that its speech acts will have their intended effect in shaping the world.  
 
The Outer Limits of the CAS’ Ability to Perform Effective Speech Acts 
 The discussion to this point has painted a rather rosy picture of the CAS as an effective 
international tribunal. The CAS successfully offers enticements for all parties to participate. The 
CAS is able to speak with great authority on rather broad array of sports-related issues.  
                                                 
193 Id. at 593. If true, this would have potentially rendered the arbitral award unenforceable under Article V(1)(b) of 
the New York Convention. 
194 Id. If true, this would have potentially rendered her suspension invalid under Article V(1)(e) of the New York 
Convention.  
195 Id. at 601.  
 48
 However, after twenty-two years of existence, there are signs that the CAS is beginning 
to reach the outer limits of its authority, and is now in danger of eroding its legitimacy through 
failed speech acts. In particular, two recent cases, those of U.S. sprinter Jerome Young and 
German cyclist Danilo Hondo, are disturbing signs about the future of the CAS. The Young case 
illustrates how CAS’ legitimacy is vulnerable to assault from within the Olympic Movement. 
The Hondo case shows how CAS also faces assault from outside the Movement.  
 
The Young Case: CAS speech acts are threatened from within  
The case of American sprinter Jerome Young is, perhaps, an ominous harbinger of things 
to come, an example of what can happen when Olympic institutions choose to ignore the words 
of the CAS.  
Jerome Young was a naturalized American196 who also happened to be one of the best 
400 meter runners in the world. As a high schooler, Young was practically legendary. He was the 
1994 Connecticut high school champion at 400 meters, the 1995 national high school champion 
in both the 200 meters and 400 meters, and the 1995 Pan Am Games gold medalist in the 4 X 
400m relay. Young was so prolific that when asked about his success, he joked that he won 
“more titles than [he could even] remember.”197 Worldwide success seemed assured in 1997 
when - only two years removed from high school - Young was already running on the US team 
at the World Championships. In 1998, Young was ascendant; he won his first US national 
championship.  
However, Jerome Young’s meteoric rise hit a snag on June 26, 1999. After winning his 
second national title in Eugene, Oregon, Young was asked to submit a urine sample for a 
                                                 
196 Jerome Young was born in Clarendon, Jamaica, but spent his teen years in Hartford, Connecticut.  
197 See Jerome Young Biography, available at http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/oldBios/2001/Young_Jerome.asp 
(last visited May 9, 2006). 
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standard drug testing (the “Eugene Sample”). The test came back positive for nandrolone, a 
notorious anabolic steroid. Usually, a positive test like this would spell doom for an athlete; 
under the penalty regime of the IAAF and U.S. Association for Track and Field (“USATF”), 
first-time offenders like Young were subject to a two-year ban from competition. For an athlete 
in the prime of his life, two years might as well have been an eternity.  
As momentous as this may have seemed to Young, not even he would have guessed that 
this single positive drug test would lead to a nightmarish, four-year legal battle between the 
United States and the rest of the Olympic Movement, one that would nearly destroy USATF and 
also threaten the very legitimacy of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  
How did the Jerome Young case go from isolated incident to international debacle? The 
first domino fell when Jerome Young insisted on his innocence, and pursuant to USATF 
regulations, appealed his positive drug test to a three-member USATF arbitration board.198 
Young pointed out that six days after he produced the damning Eugene Sample, he had given 
another urine sample at a meet in Raleigh, North Carolina (the “Raleigh Sample”).199 This 
second sample was free of any banned substances, including nandrolone. In essence, Young 
argued that it was impossible for him use nandrolone in Eugene, and then have no sign of the 
steroid in his urine six days later, in Raleigh.200 On July 10, 2000, the USATF Doping Appeals 
Board accepted Young’s argument, and exonerated the sprinter.  
                                                 
198 Young was originally found guilty by the USATF Doping Hearing Panel on March 11, 2000. Young then 
appealed this decision to the USATF Doping Appeals Board, a three-member panel of independent arbitrators. See 
Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n v. Young, CAS 2004/A/628, 8 (June 28, 2004) (on file with author). 
199 Id. at 8. 
200 There is some reason to doubt the veracity of Young’s argument. To support this claim, Jerome Young submitted 
the testimony of an expert with “no pharmacological training or experience who relied upon ‘…basic 
pharmacokinetic equations relating to blood concentrations, which were clearly irrelevant to this issue…’” Id. at 20.  
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If this were an American criminal case, the matter would end here, and Jerome Young 
would walk away a free man.201 However, unlike an American criminal justice matter, Jerome 
Young’s case only became murkier and more complicated at this point.  
The case became messy due to a glaring conflict of regulations at the domestic and 
international level. Under IAAF regulations, all domestic track and field organizations (including 
USATF) were required to report any positive drug tests to IAAF, regardless of whether a 
domestic body (such as the USATF Doping Appeals Board) acquitted the accused athlete. The 
IAAF could then overturn the acquittal, reinstate the charges against that athlete, and go on to 
suspend that athlete for years.202 For example, British sprinter Mark Richardson – like Jerome 
Young - tested positive for nandrolone in 1999 and was subsequently exonerated by the British 
track federation. However, when British officials sent the positive drug test to the IAAF, it 
overturned the acquittal and banned Richardson for two years.203 In the same year, German 
runner Dieter Baumann’s case reached a nearly identical outcome.204  
However, under its regulations in effect at the time, USATF was required to keep the 
name of an athlete who tested positive confidential until the USATF Doping Appeals Board 
upheld the positive test result.205 In essence, USATF - unlike its British, German, and other 
counterparts - gave an accused athlete the right to confidentiality until that athlete was formally 
                                                 
201 For a discussion of double jeopardy and doping, see Straubel, supra note 49, at 550 (“an IF would violate the 
prohibition against double jeopardy if it recharged and retried an athlete after an NGB has cleared the athlete”). 
202 An analogous practice continues to this day. The domestic testing organization (in the United States, this is the 
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency) may exonerate an athlete. However, the international testing organization (today, the 
World Anti-Doping Agency) still can reinstate the charges against the athlete. See, e.g., World Anti-Doping Agency 
v. Lund, CAS OG 06/001 (Feb. 10, 2006) (on file with author). 
203 See Alan Abrahamson, Pound Wants U.S. to Forfeit Medals, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at D1.  
204 Id.  
205 USATF Regulation 10(G), which was in force from December 1998 to December 1999 stated, 
Confidentiality and publication of drug test results: The names of athletes who have tested negative or who 
have provided valid excuses for failure to appear for testing shall be made available to the public. The 
names of athletes testing positive shall not be made publicly available until an athlete has been deemed 
ineligible by a DHB (Doping Hearing Board), or when the findings of the DHB have been reaffirmed by 
the DAB (Doping Appeals Board), when appropriate. Any other information will be made available only 
with prior consent of the athlete…” 
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found guilty. USATF believed that it was required to do so as a matter of federal law; the 
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1998 calls for numerous due process and procedural 
safeguards for Olympic athletes accused of doping.206 Hence, when Jerome Young was 
exonerated by USATF’s Appeals Board, USATF felt that it could not disclose his name to the 
public, or the IAAF.  
For a year after Young was exonerated, life went on. Pursuant to its regulations, USATF 
kept his overturned drug test locked away, IAAF remained in the dark, and Young continued to 
compete around in track meets around the world. However, the next domino fell on the eve of 
the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, where Jerome Young was scheduled to run as a member of 
the U.S. team. In August of 2000, the laboratory that had performed Young’s failed drug test – 
along with those of twelve other American track athletes who were similarly exonerated – tipped 
the IAAF off about the slew of positive results.207 The lab had no names to give the IAAF, 
however, as the tests were only labeled with ID numbers.208 As IAAF pondered about what to do 
with this troubling information, the Sydney Games went on, and Jerome Young won a gold 
medal as a member of the U.S. 4 X 400m relay team.209  
In September of 2000, the IAAF asked USATF to name names, and identify the thirteen 
track athletes who had tested positive. USATF pointed to its confidentiality regulations, and 
refused to disclose the names. Over the next year and a half, the organizations engaged in an 
                                                 
206 See Craig Masback, Letter to the Editor, AM. LAW., January 2002 (the CEO of USATF notes that “USATF's 
concern for athletes' rights is mandated by federal law”). Masback’s position had some merit; the Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act of 1998 does require national governing bodies (like USATF) to provide “fair notice and 
opportunity for a hearing to any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official before declaring 
the individual ineligible to participate.” Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(8).  
207 Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n v. Young, supra note 198, at 8-9.  
208 Id.  
209 Young only ran in the preliminary heats of the 4 X 400m relay for the US. However, the IOC awards relay 
medals to all runners who ran in any round of the relay event, not just the final.  
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awkward stalemate.210 At one point, the IAAF even threatened to suspend USATF as a member 
organization.211 Finally, the IAAF and USATF agreed to take their dispute to CAS.  
 
The CAS Rules on the Jerome Young Case 
After reviewing documents and hearing testimony, the CAS issued a rather stunning 
victory for USATF on January 10, 2003.212 The CAS affirmed that the USATF was bound, as a 
member organization, to follow IAAF regulations.213 However, the CAS noted that before to the 
dispute arose, USATF had repeatedly asked IAAF how USATF should resolve the conflicts in 
their respective regulations. These queries “were met with deafening silence on the part of the 
IAAF.”214 By such inaction, “IAAF caused USATF to continue with its confidentiality policy 
with the athletes.”215 The CAS declared that it would therefore be unfair to reopen cases at this 
point, noting that: 
Stripped of all vestiges of reasoning and rhetoric, and but for the 
heat and light of the hearing room, the bare truth is that, at its core, 
the case clearly concerns the lives livelihoods, and reputations of 
thirteen athletes [including Jerome Young] who no doubt have 
every reason to wonder why questions which they thought were 
resolved should now be reopened. In the opinion of the Panel, they 
should not be.216  
 
                                                 
210 The acrimony between the Olympic Movement and USATF was highlighted when the Presidents of the IOC and 
the World Anti-Doping Agency openly condemned USATF’s refusal to name names. They intimated that USATF 
was “covering up drug-test positives and, perhaps, cheating on behalf of its star athletes.” Amy Shipley, Court Rules 
in Favor of U.S. Track: Refusal to Identify Athletes in Drug Testing Case Upheld, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 
D1.  
211 See Richard W. Pound, Stonewalling has become the new American Way, Special to the Times, L.A. TIMES, 
March 9, 2003, at 1 (“Only the threat of suspension by the IAAF…prompted USATF to eventually agree to submit 
its position for determination by the Swiss-based Court of Arbitration for Sport.”). 
212 However, USATF’s victory in this case was Pyrrhic, at best. USATF spent nearly one million dollars in legal 
fees; IAAF also spent $500,000. Both sides engaged in an ugly fight that spilled into newspapers around the world. 
Tom Knight, Gold Medalist Who Failed Test Escapes Ban, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), January 11, 2003, at 5.   
213 Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n v. U.S. Assoc. for Track & Field, CAS 2002/O/401 (Jan. 10, 2003), reprinted in 
DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS III 2001-2003 36, 54 (Matthieu Reeb ed. Kluwer 2004). 
214 Id. at 62.  
215 Id. at 62-63.  
216 Id. at 64.  
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In the interests of fairness and finality, the CAS had declared that USATF did not 
have to disclose the names of the athletes to the IAAF.217  
 
Aftermath of the CAS’ Ruling 
In the immediate aftermath of the CAS’ surprising decision, Olympic officials were 
apoplectic. Dick Pound, the Chairman of the World Anti-Doping Agency (and former Vice-
President of the IOC) went so far as to publicly question the very legitimacy of the CAS. “All 
this proves is if you are big and have bad breath and are a scofflaw, you can get away with it,” 
Pound growled.218 WADA’s chief also criticized the CAS’ decision as “inflicting serious damage 
to the fight against doping in sport.”219  
Though Olympic officials clearly did not like the CAS’ verdict, they were at least willing 
to abide by it.220 That is, until August of 2003, when an enterprising staff reporter for the Los 
Angeles Times let the world know that Jerome Young was, in fact, the unknown athlete who had 
tested positive in 1999.221 Jerome Young’s public humiliation upstaged what should have been 
the proudest moment of his career; just as the devastating article was going to press, Young was 
busy winning the 400 meters at the World Championships.  
International reaction to the naming of Jerome Young was swift and furious. Writers 
around the world were appalled at the thought that Young, a doper, had just won a world title and 
                                                 
217 Id. at 67 (“…the unique facts and circumstances of this case constitute a valid and compelling reason why 
USATF should not be required to disclose the information of the relevant IAAF Rules.”). 
218 Philip Hersh, U.S. Track Body Cleared in Drug Case, CHI. TRIB.. January 11, 2003. at 6N.  
219 Pound, supra note 211.  
220 Id. (even CAS critic Dick Pound acknowledged that “[t]he CAS panel decided that the athletes – however guilty 
– were entitled to believe that their cases were completed…and could not now be considered by the IAAF.”); see 
also Owen Slot, Young's gold is tarnished by US drugs scandal, TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 28, 2003, at 42 (“The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) confirmed yesterday that the case was in the hands of the USATF and so no 
action could be taken”). 
221 Alan Abrahamson, Worldwide Perception Is a Harsh Reality for U.S., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at 1 
(“According to documents and statements obtained by The Times, USOC #13 is Jerome Young”).  
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had been allowed to win gold in Sydney.222 As pressure mounted, Olympic officials scrambled to 
give the public the pound of flesh being demanded. Dick Pound loudly proclaimed “that the 
International Olympic Committee should launch a ‘full investigation’ and act ‘decisively’ to 
‘preserve the ethical values of Olympic sport and the image of the Olympic Games.’”223  
 
There was only one small problem. Namely, the CAS had already ruled that for interests 
of finality, the matter was closed, and that USATF did not have to turn over any of the 
documents needed to prove Young’s guilt.224  
At this point, the IOC and IAAF were faced with a dilemma. On one hand, Jerome 
Young’s presence at track meets around the world was a walking, talking reminder of how 
steroid use persisted in Olympic sports; by letting him compete, the IOC and IAAF were 
endangering the “ethical values of Olympic sport.” On the other hand, the Olympics’ own court, 
the CAS, had already ruled definitively on the matter. By vigorously prosecuting him now, the 
IOC and IAAF would countermand the CAS’ edict, and undermine the tribunal’s credibility as 
the “supreme court for sport.” Faced with this difficult choice, Olympic authorities chose public 
opinion over the institutional integrity of the CAS. Jerome Young was to be prosecuted using 
every means available.  
IAAF again demanded USATF’s confidential files on Young. USATF refused, citing the 
previous CAS verdict. At this point, perhaps sensing the tenuousness of its legal position, 
Olympic authorities went so far as to began a public campaign calling for the USOC to 
                                                 
222 See, e.g., Tom Knight, Shame of an Olympic Champion, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Aug. 28, 2003, at 1.  
223 Abrahamson, supra note 203.  
224 IAAF publicly acknowledged as much; IAAF anti-doping chief Arne Ljundqvist conceded, “[w]e cannot ask 
USATF to submit any information since this is what CAS decided…” Young Off the Hook For Doping Allegations, 
REC. (WATERLOO, ONTARIO), Sept. 25, 2003, at D4.  
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voluntarily return the Olympic gold medals won by Young’s 4 X 400 meter team in Sydney. The 
USOC refused.  
Regardless of legal right, Olympic authorities ploughed doggedly on, continuing to exert 
pressure “with all means” in order get USATF to give up the files.225 As part of this effort, the 
International Olympic Committee pressured the USOC to decertify USATF and cut off nearly $3 
million in funding unless USATF released the files.226 Weary of the constant negative publicity, 
USOC relented, and in January of 2004, threatened to decertify USATF.227  
For its part, USATF was confronted with an ugly Hobson’s choice. On one hand, it could 
fight the USOC, IAAF, and IOC in domestic court, relying on the CAS judgment coupled with 
the New York Convention.228 Of course, though USATF would probably win this legal battle, 
the larger Olympic institutions could then retaliate by decertifying USATF, essentially 
obliterating that organization.229  
On the other hand, USATF could turn over the confidential files, and expose itself to a 
multi-million dollar lawsuit by Jerome Young.230 In fact, USATF went so far as to ask the USOC 
to indemnify USATF if it agreed to give up the confidential files. USOC - perhaps grasping the 
vulnerability of USATF to a civil suit by Jerome Young - unequivocally refused.231  
Ultimately, USATF took the slightly less tragic choice. That is, it did precisely what the 
CAS declared USATF had the right not to do; on February 2, 2004, USATF handed over Jerome 
Young’s confidential files, and formally confirmed that he was the athlete who tested positive in 
                                                 
225 US Sprinter Young Could Lose Sydney Gold, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 27, 2003.  
226 Elliot Almond, Officials Release Information on Steroid-Positive Olympian, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 2, 
2004.  
227 Alan Abrahamson, USATF Issued Deadline by USOC, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at D14.  
228 Id.  
229 Id.  
230 Presumably, Jerome Young could have sued USATF for its breach of confidentiality if USATF handed over the 
documents.  
231 Almond, supra note 226. 
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1999. The move was lauded as “a significant step… a step in the right direction," by USOC 
spokesman Darryl Seibel.232 Of course, Seibel did not mention that this case was also a 
significant step backwards for the authority of the CAS, along with the idea that CAS verdicts 
are truly binding on all parties, be they powerful (like the IOC or IAAF) or subservient (like 
USATF).  
 
What the Young case means for the CAS 
In essence, the Jerome Young case illustrates how the CAS can have its authority 
undermined from within, by the very Olympic Movement that created the court just decades 
earlier. The behavior of the IOC, IAAF, and USOC in the Jerome Young case does not bode well 
for the future of the CAS. When Olympic officials openly question the legitimacy of the CAS as 
an institution, and contravene the CAS’ decisions through sheer use of power, it is unlikely that 
the court can maintain its image an independent, legitimate, and effective arbitral body. Instead, 
the CAS begins to resemble courts like the ICJ, who frequently have trouble achieving 
compliance. 
And if the CAS follows the advice given to the ICJ, namely that the court build its 
legitimacy by making decisions it knows will be carried out, we would expect to see the CAS 
either duck contentious cases like Jerome Young’s, or worse, align its decisions with the interests 
of more powerful Olympic institutions.233 Because as the Young case makes very clear, if the 
                                                 
232 Id.   
233 See Jonathon I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-
Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A 
CROSSROADS 288 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).  
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CAS refuses to rule in favor of powerful Olympic institutions, these institutions may just find 
extra-legal ways of accomplishing their desired ends anyway.234  
This in mind, Prof. Hjalte Rasmussen’s warning to the European Court of Human Rights 
seems equally applicable to the CAS. Namely, all is lost if the CAS becomes no more than “the 
red-robed puppet of the powerful.”235 
 
The Hondo Case: The CAS faces an external assault 
 German cyclist Danilo Hondo and his inventive lawyer are the latest, and perhaps 
greatest threat to the CAS’ authority. For years, Hondo was a relatively obscure cyclist, 
overshadowed by more celebrated German riders like Jan Ullrich and Erik Zabel. In fact, Hondo 
spent nearly six years toiling as Zabel and Ullrich’s domestique.236 But in 2004, Hondo was 
signed to lead vaunted Team Gerolsteiner, and made an immediate splash. In addition to eight 
great stage wins, Hondo took points classification victories in no less than four stage races - 
including three in Germany. And he capped his season with a victory at the GP Beghelli, a 
highly regarded Italian race.237 
 By all indications, Hondo was continuing on his path to greatness at the start of 2005. In 
March, Hondo placed second at the Milan-Sanremo Classic, a so-called “Monument” of the 
                                                 
234 The aftermath of the Jerome Young case is interesting, and was discussed in further detail earlier in this paper. 
235 Hjalte Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court, 13 EUR. L. 
REV. 28, 37 (1988).  
236 In the sport of cycling, a domestique is a rider who works solely for the benefit of the team leader. For example, a 
domestique will block wind, fetch water, and, in Hondo’s case, drag the team leader to the head of the pack for a 
final sprint.  
237 Hedwig Kroner, From Lead-Out Man to Leader: An Interview with Danilo Hondo, CYCLINGNEWS, Nov. 23, 
2004, available at http://www.cyclingnews.com/riders/2004/interviews/?id=danilo_hondo04 (last visited May 10, 
2006).  
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European pro cycling calendar.238 And at Spain’s Tour of Murcia, Hondo won two stages, wore 
the leader’s jersey, and finished eighth overall.239 
Unfortunately for Hondo, he also tested positive at Murcia for carphedon, a banned 
stimulant said to increase physical endurance.240 As a result, Team Gerolsteiner terminated his 
contract, and the International Cycling Union (“UCI” is the international federation that governs 
the sport of cycling) pushed to ban Hondo for two years.241 On July 10, 2005, CAS formally 
upheld the UCI’s two-year ban against Hondo.242 
 Hondo, however, did not accept the CAS’ verdict. Instead, Hondo exploited a loophole in 
Swiss law that allowed him to challenge the CAS judgment in the Swiss equivalent of state 
court. Under a little-known Swiss statute, the decisions of an arbitral tribunal (like the CAS) can 
be challenged in local courts, IF the applicant is a resident of that locality. Because Hondo 
happened to keep a home in the canton of Vaud, he could file for injunctive relief with Vaud’s 
Court of Appeals. He argued that the anti-doping rules (specifically, strict liability for a positive 
drug test and an automatic two-year suspension for an athlete’s first positive drug test) were 
contrary to basic Swiss rights.  
In a decision that sent shockwaves through the entire Olympic Movement, this local court 
granted Hondo an injunction, pending a full hearing on the matter.243  
 There have been several athletes who have challenged CAS rulings in various domestic 
courts. Invariably, these athletes failed to obtain any relief. That is, until Danilo Hondo. He is the 
first athlete to ever get a domestic court to actually suspend a CAS ruling.244 Hondo was pleased 
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to be the trailblazer: “The court took our arguments seriously, and I am very happy about it…I 
have been training all along and am in good shape. Now I have to see what happens, so that I can 
start riding again as soon as possible.”245 His attorney noted, “[w]e were rewarded for not giving 
up the fight.”246 
Olympic and CAS officials are now scrambling to respond to this potential disaster. 
Hondo’s innovative use of Swiss law makes it is easy to imagine thousands of Olympic athletes 
now scrambling to purchase a Swiss home, in order to take advantage of this newfound ability to 
challenge and suspend CAS judgments in a local court. CAS General Secretary Matthieu Reeb, 
has acknowledged the precarious position the CAS finds itself in. “This is really a concern. We 
hope that the decision of the local court will not open the door, an invitation, to all athletes to 
establish domiciles in Switzerland.”247  
For its part, the World Anti-Doping Agency has attempted to downplay the importance of 
the Swiss court’s injunction. It points out that Hondo “has not yet submitted his brief on the 
merits of the case to the Court of Appeal of Canton de Vaud,” and that the Swiss court’s decision 
“is not based on the merits of the case (which have yet to be filed by the athlete), and does not 
pre-judge the final outcome of the appeal.” Hence, Olympic officials insist, “it is misleading to 
claim that [the Swiss court’s] decision constitutes…an annulment of the CAS decision.”248 For 
his part, CAS General Secretary Matthieu Reeb does not appear particularly worried about 
having the CAS’ decision ultimately overturned: “The athlete tested positive for carphedon and 
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he had no explanation at all to say why carphedon was found in his urine… So I don't know what 
the (Vaud court) will say if it thinks there is something wrong.”249 
 However, there is reason to think that the situation is more dire than Olympic and CAS 
officials let on. Courts in Vaud do not give out injunctions on a whim. Swiss and Vaud civil 
procedure makes clear that some strong basis must exist in order for a court to grant this 
temporary relief. 
How the Swiss court ultimately resolves this case will certainly have some impact on the 
authority of the CAS.250 Regardless of how the local court ultimately decides, however, it has 
already demonstrated just how fragile a CAS speech act can actually be. One small court sitting 
in an isolated Swiss canton was able to singlehandedly suspend the force of the CAS’ words, and 
reinstate Hondo’s ability to compete as a professional cyclist. With a mere injunction, the 
supreme court for world sport’s confidence has been shaken.  
 
Conclusion 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport was envisioned as the “supreme court for world sport,” 
a place that could settle athletic disputes from around the world with speed, efficiency, and 
finality. After twenty-two years, Juan Antonio Samaranch’s dream is reaching fruition. In order 
to find out why the CAS succeeds while so many international tribunals fail, this paper analyzed 
the CAS along two dimensions: party preference and speech act capability. Both of these 
characteristics are crucial to the success of the CAS.  
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Party Preference for CAS 
As for party preference, if an entrepreneurial court like the CAS to succeed, there must be 
some reason why parties prefer it to other means of dispute resolution. Unless the CAS is a 
“value-adding” institution that is superior to alternatives, we would expect to see the CAS left 
with a barren docket as parties in dispute simply go elsewhere.  
 When we look at the CAS along the party preference dimension, the court rates very 
highly. Before the CAS, sports disputes were handled in two kinds of forums: domestic courts 
and internal hearings. For athletes, the CAS is vastly preferable to either of these alternatives. 
Domestic courts are slow, costly, and are often unable to settle disputes with finality. Internal 
hearings represent the ultimate “stacked deck,” as the athlete’s accuser also happens to be her 
judge, jury, and executioner. Olympic institutions also have plenty of reason to prefer the CAS. 
Domestic courts are veritable legal minefields, where Olympic institutions face hostile local 
judges and unfamiliar laws. Internal hearings allow Olympic institution to retain control over the 
outcome of a dispute, but also leave these institutions vulnerable to the public criticism that these 
decisions are sure to provoke.  
 Compared to these alternatives, the CAS is value-adding for both athletes and Olympic 
institutions, in that it preserves the best aspects of domestic courts and internal hearings, while 
avoiding most drawbacks. The CAS is fast, cheap, and (theoretically) impartial. At the same 
time, the CAS also represents “public relations insurance” for Olympic institutions, as they can 
essentially hoist any blame for controversial decisions onto the court. As such, it is easy to see 
why parties would be drawn to the CAS to resolve Olympic disputes.  
 However, the CAS’ universally value-adding status is coming under fire, as some athletes 
have complained about the court’s appointment process. Under the current CAS appointment 
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system, Olympic institutions retain the ability to essentially ‘pack the court’ with nominees. 
Frequently, high-ranking members of Olympic institutions go so far as to name themselves to 
positions in the CAS! If more athletes perceive the CAS as overly biased or inherently unfair, the 
court may one day find itself with a barren docket as Olympic athletes unionize or find other 
ways to resist CAS jurisdiction.  
 
The CAS and Speech Act Theory 
 Words and language are the tools of any court. And in many cases, words and language 
are all a court has to work with. But words alone are not always enough to get parties to actually 
comply with a judgment. When the ICJ ordered Iran to release American hostages, the court’s 
words fell on deaf ears in Tehran.251 When the U.S. Supreme Court, in Worcester v. Georgia, 
declared that Cherokee Indians in Georgia had a right to peaceably enjoy their land, the President 
of the United States scoffed.252 Without the ability to compel action, the words of a court, to use 
Andrew Jackson’s phrase, are “still born.”253 
 The CAS, however, enjoys a unique advantage in this regard, because in its most high-
profile cases, all the court needs are words. When the CAS declares, “Geoff is the true gold 
medal winner,” and “Sam is NOT the gold medal winner,” it by words alone can bestow the 
status of “gold medal winner” on Geoff and strip it away from Sam. As the Young case 
illustrated, it hardly matters whether Sam returns his physical gold medal or not, because being 
‘the gold medalist’ has almost nothing to do with possession, and nearly everything to do with 
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status. The CAS enjoys success because in this unique class of controversy, it wields a “quasi-
magical” power to transmutate a coveted Olympic medal into just a hunk of metal.254  
The CAS deals in more than just medal disputes, of course. It also settles commercial and 
disciplinary matters. In these areas, the court looks much more like a typical international 
tribunal. It issues a verdict and requires some additional extra-lingual force to compel parties to 
comply. For the CAS, the New York Convention, a multi-national treaty, supplies this force.  
 The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s ability to issue effective speech acts come under fire 
in two recent cases. The Young case illustrates how powerful Olympic institutions can undermine 
the CAS from within, by ignoring CAS verdicts and instead using extra-legal means to coerce 
weaker parties. The Hondo case drives home just how much the CAS relies on domestic courts 
to respect the CAS’ judgment, as even a small local Swiss court was able to suspend a final 
verdict from the CAS.  
The CAS is a remarkable anomaly among international tribunals, in that it has been 
wildly successful. At the same time, the CAS’ curious success rests on the razor’s edge. Unless 
the CAS is mindful of the looming threats outlined throughout this paper, Samaranch’s dream for 
the “supreme court for world sport” may yet fail.  
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